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Abstract
Over the past two decades, globalization in capital markets has led to the growth of
equity listings in more than one market. Such growth has heightened the levels of
competition among stock exchanges, especially in terms of attracting more foreign
listings and the associated business opportunities. Hence, nding ways to achieve a
competitive advantage over other markets is becoming more crucial for exchanges.
This has emphasized the need to understand how prices are formed in multiple
markets. In that respect, this thesis intends to add to the understanding of the price
formation process for stocks with foreign listings through three empirical studies. In
terms of application, this thesis focuses on Canadian stocks which are listed on the
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE).
The rst essay contributes to our understanding of the impact of news arrival on
price discovery. It employs macroeconomic news announcements as proxies for new
information and examines the impact of these announcements on price discovery
of cross-listed stocks. This study reveals that price discovery shifts signicantly
from Canada to the U.S. during days with a macroeconomic news announcement,
regardless of the origin of the news. This nding shows that markets di¤er in terms
of information processing capability, particularly with regard to the processing of
market-wide information.
The second essay examines the dynamics of price discovery for cross-listed stocks.
We model the interactions between daily price discovery measures, trading volume,
bid-ask spread, and algorithmic trading activity using a vector autoregression, taking
into account lagged and contemporaneous relations among the variables. We observe
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that price discovery exhibits a trend and persistence over time. Improvements in
liquidity increase an exchanges contribution to price discovery, while at the same
time, an increase in price discovery leads to better liquidity. We also nd that
algorithmic trading activity is negatively related to price discovery of cross-listed
stocks, which we attribute to the crowding out e¤ect as arbitrageurs make use of
computers to trade aggressively and compete for arbitrage opportunities that exist
in their respective markets. As a consequence, high-frequency trading by these
arbitrageurs push away informed investors, who are disadvantaged in terms of speed.
The third essay assesses how information is incorporated into prices in multiple
markets. We develop a general model to assess how quotes in dual markets react
to information coming from quotes and trades. We further develop this model
to extract an implied model for the spreads, the e¢ cient price, and the relative
premium between the two markets. We observe that quotes of cross-listed stocks are
linked directly to each other. We nd evidence of intermarket competition between
liquidity providers as indicated by signicant impacts of bid-ask spreads on quotes
in both markets. We also nd that while prices adjust primarily to trades in their
respective market, there is some impact by trades from another market. This nding
suggests that there is some degree of informational segmentation between markets.
On the whole, the above ndings describe the mechanisms of how information is
incorporated into prices for dually-listed stocks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Market microstructure is the area of nance concerned with the trading processes
of securities in nancial markets. It studies how security prices are formed from
investorsdemands into order submissions and ultimately into transactions (Madha-
van, 2000). As such, research in this area covers the di¤erent aspects of trades such
as: transaction costs, prices, quotes, and volume. Market microstucture research
helps explain why prices exhibit particular time-series properties, thus enhancing
our ability to understand the returns to nancial assets and the process underlying
such price formation. As market microstructure explains the behavior of prices and
markets, it has immediate application in the regulation of markets, and in the design
and formulation of new trading mechanisms, making trade more e¢ cient.
One interesting aspect of microstructure research is its evolution. Interests in market
microstructure are driven by rapid structural, technological, and regulatory changes
a¤ecting securities markets worldwide. The proliferation of new nancial instru-
ments, the growth of electronic trading, and the growth in foreign listings are trans-
forming the landscape of nancial markets, thus, emphasizing the relative impor-
tance of microstructure research.
During the past two decades, globalization in capital markets has made trading and
owning securities from around the world easier. Equity listings in more than one
1
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market are becoming an increasingly important strategic issue for companies look-
ing for direct access to foreign capital markets.1 As more companies become global,
the international integration of capital markets has led to unprecedented levels of
competition among stock exchanges. In this intermarket competition between ex-
changes, the winners are the exchanges that manage to attract more foreign listings
and the associated trading volume and business opportunities.
The importance of foreign listings for exchanges has emphasized the need to under-
stand the price formation process for stocks in a multi-market context. In the case
of stocks that are listed and traded in multiple markets, information may come from
any of the markets. Investors too, have the option to trade in a market they prefer.
Consequently, prices of stocks are determined by information entering the market as
well as trading activity in these markets. However, we often observe that investors
have a preference to trade in one market over the other. Understanding how prices
are determined and the mechanisms underlying security trades in these markets are
crucial in determining which factors contribute to the competitiveness of a market.
The topic examined in this thesis is primarily based on the process of price forma-
tion in multiple markets. Why this particular focus? For market participants, the
focus emphasizes the importance of information in decision making. New informa-
tion forms the basis for liquidity providers to adjust their expectations on an assets
fundamental value, and to update their prices. Investors too, revise their expecta-
tions based on the information they obtain, and subsequently, trade in the cheapest
and the most liquid trading venue. Furthermore, exchanges and regulators continu-
ously strive to nd ways to achieve competitive advantage over other exchanges and
markets. In that respect, the ndings in this thesis indicate areas where exchange
o¢ cials and market regulators should focus on in order to adjust and introduce new
trading rules, keeping markets competitive.
1See for example, Pagano et al. (2002), Karolyi (2006), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), and
Halling et al. (2008) for evidences of cross-listings.
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As a starting point for this thesis, Chapter 2 presents a primer on market microstruc-
ture with an emphasis on how prices are determined in a market. The chapter starts
with a discussion on market frictions and how they cause prices observed in the mar-
ket to di¤er from their true values. We then introduce the notion of price discovery,
which concerns the process of how di¤erent information sources contribute to the
evolution of an assets fundamental value. Price discovery reects the competi-
tiveness of a market to incorporate information into prices, and indicates in which
market investors prefer to trade. This chapter also assesses the importance of in-
formation coming from trades, and how such information a¤ects prices in terms of
quote midpoints, and induces asymmetric responses from the bid and ask prices.
Given the importance of information for security prices, our rst objective is to ex-
amine the role of information arrival on price discovery. One important source of
new information is the release of macroeconomic news. These news announcements
provide indications for the near-term policy changes that will subsequently be used
by investors to price securities. Since macroeconomic news announcements are pre-
scheduled, the timing of such releases is known, and investors may choose to trade
on this information in one or another market. This may lead to a temporal shift in
price discovery between markets which is related to the arrival of information from
macroeconomic news announcements. In Chapter 3, we take the above predictions
and examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on the price dis-
covery of cross-listed stocks. Specically, we analyze the impact of macroeconomic
news releases on the level of price discovery between two markets by comparing the
price discovery between days with and without news releases. By assessing a mar-
kets contribution to price discovery, we gain additional insight on the information
processing capacity of a market.
Examining Canadian stocks which are cross-listed in the U.S., we observe that price
discovery shifts towards the U.S. market during days with macroeconomic news
3
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announcements, regardless of the origin of the news. This nding indicates that
some markets are better at processing information than others. It also implies that
information induces a shift in price discovery from one market to another, hence,
indicating dynamics in price discovery.
While the dynamics of price discovery provides additional insight to the literature, it
raises several questions which have yet to be addressed, such as: does price discovery
persist once gained by a particular market? Is price discovery benecial for a market?
How does a market improve its contribution to price discovery? Existing literature
has not fully addressed these issues because studies tend to measure price discovery
at one point in time over a period. As such, extant studies tend to assess cross-
sectional di¤erences in price discovery and determinants of those di¤erences, rather
than the dynamics of price discovery over time.2
In Chapter 4, we address the above questions by examining the dynamics of price
discovery. We rst compute daily measures of price discovery from January 2004 to
January 2011. By doing so, we are able to assess the evolution and persistence in
price discovery which have not been explored previously. We then show how changes
in price discovery over time can be attributed to various factors. For instance, in-
vestors have the tendency to trade in the cheaper and more liquid market. Such
liquidity-motivated trading may cause information clustering in a market, which may
lead to a shift in price discovery. Furthermore, the automation of trading activity
helps investors scan public information faster and trade on this information. Such
speed and intensity of trading activity may also lead to changes in price discovery
between markets. Based on these expectations, we analyse the bi-directional rela-
tions between price discovery and other market quality measures such as liquidity
and algorithmic trading activity. Thus, our analyses also shed light on what drives
2Extant studies nd that the home market tends to lead in terms of price discovery because
it is the market where most information about the company is generated (see e.g. Lieberman et
al.,1999; Hupperets and Menkveld, 2002; Grammig et al., 2005). However, these studies assume
that the information processing capacity of a market does not change over time.
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a markets contribution to price discovery, and on the importance of price discovery
for a market.
To further improve our understanding of price formation process, we assess the
mechanisms of how information is incorporated into prices. Microstructure theories
suggest that information can be inferred from trade-related activities, such as the
direction of trade (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Jang and Venkatesh, 1991), trading
volume (Easley and OHara, 1987; Barclay and Warner, 1993) and trade order
ow (Kyle, 1985). These variables reect information signals from various market
participants. How these variables lead to updates in the markets expectation about
the long-run value of a stock, reects the mechanism by which information drives
prices. As shown in Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001), Engle and Patton (2004),
and Escribano and Pascual (2005), such mechanism is better observed from the
dynamics of bid and ask prices, rather than the quote midpoint. That is because
information causes asymmetric revisions of market quotes. Bid and ask prices do
not respond symmetrically to buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades.
Motivated by the above studies, we aim to improve the understanding of the price
formation process for stocks with foreign listings. In Chapter 5, we assess the mech-
anism of how information gets incorporated into prices through studying quote dy-
namics in multiple markets. We incorporate various microstructure theories which
have been shown to drive prices in a single market setting, and develop a general
model for quote dynamics of stocks traded in dual markets. Specically, we model
the bid and ask quotes in two di¤erent markets simultaneously, and allow these quote
revisions to be a function of quote-related information (e.g. the bid-ask spread and
the di¤erence in quoted depth), and trade-related information (e.g. trade direction,
size, duration, and order ow). This model allows us to examine how information
a¤ects prices in dual markets, and to evaluate the degree of information spillover
between markets. At the same time, the model can be used to assess the relevance
5
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of existing microstructure theories in explaining price dynamics in a multi-market
setting. Our model can further be transformed into an implied vector autoregression
(VAR) for the bid-ask spreads in the two markets, the midpoint of prices (the im-
plied e¢ cient price of the cross-listed stock) and the di¤erence in midquotes across
markets (the relative premium between markets). How information a¤ects these
variables reects the mechanism of how information gets incorporated into prices
for dually-listed stocks.
Overall, this thesis is intended to improve our understanding of stocks with foreign
listings. The chapters in this thesis cover several empirical market microstructure
issues regarding the price formation process in multiple markets, such as the impact
of news arrival on price discovery, the determinants and trends in price discovery,
and the role of information on quotes in multiple markets. To conclude, Chapter
6 highlights the importance of our results and their implications to practice and
academia.
6
Chapter 2
A Primer on Market Microstructure
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a primer on market microstructure, with a focus on how prices
are determined in a market. We discuss several market frictions that lead to trading
costs and a¤ect prices. We further develop a general framework on how prices in two
di¤erent markets are linked. This framework becomes the basis of price discovery
measures which forms an integral part of this thesis. We discuss how information
can be inferred from trades and how prices respond to such information. Finally, as
this thesis is directed towards understanding stocks with foreign listings, we discuss
about the markets involved in our studies.
2.2 How Prices are Determined
One of the fundamental questions in nance is what determines a price? Economic
theory suggests that price is the result of intersecting supply and demand curves for
a particular good. The equilibrium price is achieved when the quantity supplied and
quantity demanded at that price are equal. Using that as a basis, the early theory in
market microstructure suggests that price formation process could be captured by
a Walrasian auction. The mechanism starts with traders submitting their demands
7
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to the auctioneer. The auctioneer announces a potential trading price, and traders
then revise their orders. This process is repeated until there is no further revision.
Equilibrium is achieved at the price where the quantity supplied equals the quantity
demanded.
The downside of this process is that while over time the quantity supplied might
equal the quantity demanded, at any particular point in time such an outcome is
not guaranteed. If the quantity supplied by traders who wish to sell immediately
does not equal the quantity demanded by traders who wish to buy immediately, the
imbalance of trade will make it impossible to nd a market clearing price at a given
time.
Demsetz (1968) argues that the lack of equlibrium could be overcome by paying a
premium for immediate execution. If there is an excess demand by traders wanting
to buy immediately, these traders either have to wait for more sellers to arrive, or
they can o¤er a higher price to induce existing sellers to increase their supplies and
transact now. This practise creates a di¤erence between the fundamental value of an
asset (i.e. the e¢ cient price), and the price observed in the market. The di¤erence
in these prices is the cost of immediacy, and reects the frictions that are present in
the market. How prices are a¤ected by di¤erent market frictions set the stage for
the formal study of market microstructure.
2.2.1 Market Frictions and Trading Costs
In the eld of market microstructure, we acknowledge that prices are a¤ected by
various market frictions. Understanding the role of frictions is a logical starting
point for an exploration of how prices are actually determined. Here, we provide an
overview of the frictions observed in nancial markets.
Market frictions lead to various costs that liquidity providers must bear when match-
ing buyers and sellers and providing immediacy in a market. In order to be com-
8
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pensated for these costs, a liquidity provider will post two di¤erent prices; the price
at which he wants to buy (bid price), and the price at which he wants to sell (ask
price). This creates a positive di¤erence between the two prices called the spread.
It represents the income the liquidity provider gains from a round trip transaction
(a buy followed by a sell, or vice versa). The spread can therefore be seen as the
compensation to the market maker for frictions. Hence, the lower the frictions, the
smaller the trading costs, and subsequently, the narrower the spreads.
One type of friction comes from the sunk cost, which is a concept originally intro-
duced by Benston and Hagerman (1974) based on Demsetz (1968). The sunk cost
represents the xed expenses in conducting a trade (such as labour, communica-
tion, clearing and record keeping expenses). Liquidity providers account for these
expenses in the form of order processing cost, and is reected in wider spreads. Due
to order processing cost, the ask price that a liquidity provider o¤ers to traders
who wish to buy, is higher than the e¢ cient price, while the bid price is lower than
the e¢ cient price. When only order processing costs are present, quotes are centred
symmetrically around the true price. Liquidity providers do not adjust their bid and
ask prices after the occurrence of a transaction and spreads remain fairly constant.
Another type of friction comes from the risk of carrying and managing inventories
to meet the requirements of investors who demand immediacy. Stoll (1978) and
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) argue that liquidity providers must be compensated
for this risk. An unwanted inventory position poses a risk to the liquidity provider.
He, therefore, quotes a wider spread compared to when he only faces order processing
costs. Hence, another component of trading cost arises, which is known as the
inventory cost. The inventory cost leads to dynamics in the quoted prices. For
example, when a liquidity provider receives a sell order (i.e. a transaction at the
bid price), his inventory position increases. When this position is unwanted, he will
lower both his bid and ask prices so that less people sell and more people buy. By
9
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adjusting his bid and ask prices, a liquidity provider maintains a stable inventory
position.
The last type of friction comes from information asymmetry. This concept has
its roots in the study of Bagehot (1971) who makes a distinction in the market
between informed and uninformed traders. The uninformed traders are those who
have access to publicly available information and trade mainly for liquidity reasons.
The informed traders, on the other hand, are either those who are able to react
more timely to the release of new information, or those who simply have superior
information. These traders buy when they know the current stock price is too low,
and sell when they know it is too high. Trading with informed traders leads to losses
for the liquidity providers. To remain solvent, liquidity providers o¤set those losses
by making gains from the uninformed traders in the form of wider bid-ask spreads.
This leads to the last component of trading cost known as the adverse selection cost.
It reects the compensation a liquidity provider must obtain for trading with the
informed.
The discussion above show how frictions lead to various costs of trading and a¤ect
prices. Glosten and Harris (1988) show that these price impacts can be classied
into transitory and permanent components. Order processing and inventory costs
are considered transitory because they reect temporary deviation in price needed to
accomodate a trade, which are not related to the underlying value of the securities.
The adverse selection cost, however, has permanent impact on prices because they
result in liquidity providers revising their expectations on the fundamental value of
the securities.
One of the instances where frictions lead to temporary and permanent price changes
is during the arrival of new information. News arrivals, for example, induce more
trades to occur in a market, leading the components of trading costs to change. Fol-
lowing the arrival of news, inventory cost may increase temporarily because liquidity
10
Chapter 2. A Primer on Market Microstructure
providers need to ll up inventories in order to meet market demands. Information
asymmetry between the informed and uninformed traders may also increase, lead-
ing to an increase in adverse selection cost and a permanent change in prices. The
extent to which information a¤ects the underlying value of an asset leads to the
notion of price discovery. This will be discussed in the next section.
2.2.2 Price Discovery
Price discovery is a eld in market microstructure that concerns itself with the
process of how di¤erent information sources contribute to the evolution of the un-
derlying value of an asset. Given that the amount of frictions di¤er between markets,
information a¤ects prices di¤erently in these markets. Price discovery is relevant
for stocks with foreign listings as it highlights the relative contribution of a market
over another market to the evolution of the fundamental value of the stock. In this
section, we introduce a model for prices, in which frictions can be considered. We
then extend this model to account for prices in multiple markets. This sets the
framework for measuring price discovery.
We start with the assumption that each asset has an e¢ cient price. This unobserved
e¢ cient price represents the underlying value of an asset conditional on all available
public information. Following Madhavan (2000), we assume that all investors share
the same public information set, and prices are e¢ cient in the sense that the current
price reects future price expectations conditional on the available information set.
Consequently, the e¢ cient (log) price, pt, follows a random walk,
pt = pt 1 + t; (2.1)
where t is the innovation in public beliefs. The existence of market frictions (e.g.
order processing cost, inventory holding cost, asymmetric information cost) leads
to deviations from the e¢ cient price, resulting in two di¤erent prices that market
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makers trade at. The observed transaction price, yt, is equal to the e¢ cient price and
the friction component, t, which is positive (negative) for a buy (sell) transaction
and zero for a transaction at the midpoint,
yt = pt + t: (2.2)
In the case of an asset trading in two di¤erent markets, the observed prices in both
markets, share one common stochastic trend. Let yt = ( y1;t y2;t )
0 be the price
vector where y1;t and y2;t are the prices in the two markets. In a multivariate setting,
this can be expressed as:

y1;t
y2;t

= pt +

1;t
2;t

; (2.3)
where  is a (21) unit vector. This equation can be seen as the integrated process of
random walk and news innovations plus the market frictions observed at time t. The
study of price discovery relies on the assumption that when a single security trades
in two di¤erent markets, prices in the two markets share a common e¢ cient price,
pt. Since prices in both markets are driven by the same underlying fundamentals,
the prices should be cointegrated. Therefore, the two I(1) price series y1;t and y2;t
are cointegrated with cointegrating vector, 0 = ( 1  1 ). Subsequently, 0yt =
y1;t   y2;t, which is a stationary process will be the error correction term. The
EngleGranger Representation Theorem states that a cointegrated system can be
expressed as an error-correction model of the following form,
yt = c+ 
0yt 1 +
NP
i=1
 iyt 1 + t; (2.4)
where yt is the (2  1) vector of log returns, c is a vector of constants,  is a
(2  1) vector that measures the speed of adjustment to the error-correction term,
 i are (2 2) matrices of autoregression (AR) coe¢ cients, and t is a (2 1) vector
of innovations. The vector error correction model (VECM) above has two parts:
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the rst part, 0yt 1, represents the long-run equilibrium between the price series,
and the second part,
PN
i=1  iyt 1, represents the short-term dynamics induced by
market imperfections.
The above VECM forms the basis for measuring price discovery. There are two main
measures that are often used to investigate the mechanics of price discovery: the
Gonzalo Granger (1995) Permanent-Transitory (PT) model, and Hasbrouck (1995)
Information Share (IS). They are directly related, and the results of both models
are primarily derived from the VECM. Despite this initial similarity, the IS and
PT measure price discovery di¤erently. The PT measure is concerned with the
permanent shocks that result in a disequilibrium as markets process news at di¤erent
speeds. Thus, the PT measures each markets contribution to the e¢ cient price,
where the contribution is dened to be a function of the markets error correction
coe¢ cients; in this case, the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients, . The IS, on the other
hand, measures the proportion of variance contributed by one market with respect
to the variance of the innovations in the common e¢ cient price. This contribution
is called the markets information share.
These two measures of price discovery form an integral part of this thesis. Essen-
tially, these measures indicate which market contributes more to the formation of
the underlying value of a cross-listed asset. The market which contributes more to
price discovery incorporates new information into prices faster and has better infor-
mation processing capacity than the other market. We argue that such contribution
can be attributed to various factors. In Chapter 3, we conjecture that the arrival
of new information may induce investors to trade in one or another market. This
may lead to a temporal shift in price discovery. In Chapter 4, we evaluate how price
discovery varies over time and what areas an exchange (or market) should focus on
to improve price discovery.
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2.2.3 Trades and Prices
In the previous section, we discuss the adverse selection component of trading costs.
As liquidity providers lose on average to the informed traders, the spread reects
a balancing of losses to the informed with gains from the uninformed traders. The
notion that asymmetric information is priced provide a fundamental insight into the
nature of price formation.
The informed traders prot from trading if prices are not at full-information levels.
During such times, any informed trader will prefer to trade as much and as often
as possible. However, such behavior would quickly reveal the information of the
informed trader. Liquidity providers would quickly adjust their prices to reect
this information. The ability to learn from trades means that the process by which
information is impounded into prices could be addressed by analyzing how liquidity
providers learn from trade-related activities.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) use this insight and develop a pricing model of liquidity
providers. They focus on the fact that in a competitive market, informed agents
trades will reect their information, either selling if they know bad news or buying if
they know good news. If a trader wants to sell to the market, it could signal either
that he knows bad news, or he is uninformed and simply needs liquidity. Since the
liquidity provider cannot tell which is the case, he protects himself by adjusting his
beliefs about the value of the stock, conditional on the type of trade that occurs.
Subsequently, his expectation of the assets value changes, and so do his prices.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) demonstrate that, over time, the dominance of trades
on one side of the market results in the liquidity provider eventually learning the
informed tradersinformation. His prices will then converge to the expected value
of the asset given this information.
If a market is e¢ cient, the price of a security should reect the value of its underlying
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assets. However, we often observe that large trades have persistent price impacts,
with trade prices lower after large sales and higher after large purchases (see e.g.
Dann, Mayers, and Raab, 1977; Holthausen et al., 1987). Easley and OHara (1987)
examine how the ability to transact orders for large or small quantities provides the
potential to address the e¤ects of trade size on security prices. Informed traders are
assumed to be risk neutral and trade to maximise their expected prots. Conse-
quently, trade size induces an adverse selection problem, because at the same price,
the informed trader always prefers to trade larger quantities. Since uninformed
traders do not share this bias, a rational liquidity provider will interpret large or-
ders as a signal of information-based trading and adjust prices accordingly. As a
result, the liquidity providers pricing strategies will depend on trade size, with large
trades being made at less favorable prices.
Kyle (1985) shows that apart from the direction and volume of trade, information
can also be inferred from an order ow. Liquidity providers set prices and trade the
quantity which clears the market. Since they do not observe individual quantities
traded by the informed and the uninformed separately, and do not have any other
kind of special information, they set prices based on the observations of the cur-
rent and past aggregate quantities traded by the informed and uninformed traders
combined, known as the order ow.
The literature above demonstrates that trades convey new information that leads to
updates in the markets expectation about the fundamental value of an asset. Such
a relation has been modelled empirically. Perhaps the most inuential model is that
of Hasbrouck (1991), who jointly models the data generating processes of prices
and trades. He suggests that midquote revisions and trades can be modeled as a
vector autoregressive system. Such a model demonstrates the importance of trades
for price revisions and depicts the transmission of information that is incorporated
into prices.
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2.2.4 Asymmetries in Bid and Ask Responses
Hasbrouck (1991) adds to our understanding of price dynamics and on how infor-
mation from trades gets incorporated into security prices. However, since the quote
dynamics are averaged through the quote midpoint, the model assumes that bid and
ask prices respond symmetrically to trades. To learn more about price formation
processes, we also need to evaluate the asymmetries in the dynamics of bid and ask
prices. As discussed in Escribano and Pascual (2006), there is additional informa-
tion gained from analyzing the dynamics of ask and bid prices jointly rather than
averaging them through the quote midpoint.
Several empirical studies have shown that price responses to buyer- and seller-
initiated trades may be asymmetric. For example, Jang and Venkatesh (1991) report
that, in the NYSE, bid and ask quote revisions after trades are often observed to be
asymmetrical. When a trade occurs at the ask (generally classied as a buy) the ask
is more likely to be raised than the bid. Biais et al. (1991) shows that asymmetries
between ask and bid quotes are not exclusive to the NYSE. Furthermore, the em-
pirical work of Holthausen et al. (1987), Gri¢ ths et al. (2000), Koski and Michaely
(2000) suggest that buyer-initiated trades are more informative than seller-initiated
trades. Hence, they conclude that the impact of a buyer-initiated trade may not
simply be the reverse of the price impact of seller-initiated trade.
Buyer- and seller-initiated trades may not be equally informative for several rea-
sons. First, buy orders are more informative than sell orders because short-selling
restrictions may prevent the informed traders from exploiting negative information
in the market (Kempf and Korn, 1999). Second, short-sale restrictions also mean
that traders can choose among many potential assets to buy, but when they sell,
they are limited to those assets they already own. Hence, the choice of a particular
stock to buy, out of the numerous possibilities on the market, is likely to be more
informationally motivated, while the choice to sell tends to be liquidity motivated
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(see e.g. Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Keim and Madhavan, 1995).
Motivated by the evidence above, we propose that in order to further assess how
prices are determined in multiple markets, we need to also examine the responses
of bid and ask quotes to the arrival of information. In Chapter 5, we look at quote
dynamics and assess how various information a¤ects quote revisions in multiple
markets. Empirically, we model quote revisions from dual markets simultaneously
in a VAR setting. In doing so, we are not only able to analyze any asymmetries in
the impacts of trades on the bid or the ask prices from multiple markets, but also
analyze the degree of information spillover among these markets. Since the empirical
part of this thesis focuses on cross-listed stocks, we will discuss the process of stock
selections in the next section.
2.3 The Canadian and the U.S. Markets
In this thesis, we focus on Canadian stocks which are listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX) and cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). These
stocks are chosen because the nature of cross-listings of Canadian stocks in the U.S.
o¤ers several advantages. Before we compare the features of the TSX and the NYSE,
we briey describe the structure of the TSX and important changes that inuenced
the nature of how trading was conducted in both markets.
The TSX was incorporated in 1878. It had soon grown in size and in shares traded
to become the second largest stock exchange in Canada after the Montreal Stock
Exchange.1 In 1977, the TSX introduced CATS (Computer Assisted Trading Sys-
tem), an automated trading system that started to be used for the quotation of less
liquid equities. It was one of the rst technologies allowing for a full automation
of the price-setting process in a stock exchange. Following the success of CATS,
1Following the Canadian capital markets restructuring in 1999, the Montreal Stock Exchange
became Canadas derivatives exchange while the Toronto Stock Exchange became Canadas sole
exchange for the trading of senior equities.
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the TSX closed its trading oor in April 1997, making it the second-largest stock
exchange in North America to choose a oorless, electronic trading environment.
Since then, the TSX operates an entirely electronic market with a centralized limit
order book. As per June 2014, the TSX is the eighth largest exchange in the world
by market capitalization, and the third largest single group of exchange after the
NYSE and NASDAQ. Generally, the blue-chip Canadian rms are listed on both
the TSX and NYSE. Among the foreign stocks listed in the United States, Canadian
listings constitute the largest group of stocks from a single country.
2.3.1 Alternative Trading Systems, Consolidated Tape, and
the Order Protection Rule
There were several important changes that inuenced the nature of trading mecha-
nism in the U.S. and Canada, such as the emergence of alternative trading systems
(ATSs), the use of consolidated tape, and the Order Protection Rule (OPR). In
this section, we explain these changes in both markets and their consequences for
trading.
The presence of ATSs means that orders can be executed in various trading venues.
For instance, stocks listed on the NYSE can be traded in the NYSE and in various
regional exchanges such as the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE), Cincinnati Stock
Exchange (CSE) and in an electronic communication network, BATS. In the U.S.,
ATSs have existed since the 1970s. In Canada, however, ATSs only started to
emerge in mid-2007 with the arrival of alternative markets such as PURE trading,
ALPHA trading, CHI-X and Omega. This means that the TSX was no longer the
sole exchange for the trading of senior securities in Canada.
The development of ATSs emphasized the need to have a market integrator to in-
terconnect data from the new markets. Without a connected data source, each
exchange chooses a di¤erent data vendor to publish their data. It took a signi-
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cant amount of time before data vendors had su¢ cient information from all markets
to be able to publish any sort of combined quotations. Hence, there was a need
to establish a consolidated quotation system which provides continuous, real-time
data on trading volume and price from various exchanges. In the U.S., the consoli-
dated tape system started in 1978, with NASDAQ being the information processor.
The system provides its subscribers quotation information for stocks traded on the
American Stock Exchange, NYSE, and other regional stock exchanges. In Canada,
the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) selected the TMX group to fulll the
information processor role in 2009.2 The consolidated tape functioned for the rst
time in Canada in mid-2010.
The consolidated tape system, however, would not work well if there was no binding
trading rule in place to ensure orders were executed fairly. In the early days of com-
petition, regulators required dealers to achieve the best price in lling client orders.
In order to fulll their best price obligation, a dealer was required to make reason-
able e¤orts to achieve the best price. A lack of clarity around what constituted
compliance with the rule meant that dealers could carry out orders at a non-optimal
price even though a better price was available on the same exchange or other ex-
changes. This triggered a series of initiatives designed to modernize and strengthen
the securities markets. In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
passed a set of rules called the Regulation National Market System (Reg. NMS). It
was intended to help create a more integrated market through improved fairness in
price execution, and to improve the displaying of quotes and access to market data.
One of the most inuential components of the Reg. NMS is the Order Protection
Rule (OPR) which requires that marketplaces enforce policies to ensure consistent
price quotation and prevent trading through a better priced order on another mar-
ket. The OPR was implemented in the U.S. as part of the Reg. NMS which was
adopted in stages from 2006 to 2007. In Canada, the OPR was introduced on Feb
2The TMX group is the parent company of the TSX.
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1, 2011.
2.3.2 Market Features
The Canadian and the U.S. markets have properties which makes them distinctive
from other market combinations for multi-market empirical studies. First, Canada
and the U.S. markets have a highly integrated nature, which enables easy access
for rms to list and also for investors to invest in the other countrys exchanges.
Many Canadian rms listed on the TSX also cross-list their stocks on the main U.S.
exchanges such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. The extent of integration of
the exchanges is shown by the fact that many of the cross-listed Canadian rms
report their nancial statements and pay dividends in US dollars.
Second, the U.S. and Canadian markets have the longest overlapping trading hour
compared to any other market pairs. There is no time di¤erence for the open-
ing and closing trading time between TSX and NYSE (09.30am to 04:00pm EST).
The importance of this is pointed out by Hupperets and Menkveld (2002), who
nd increased volume, volatility and spread during the overlapping trading hours
that suggest the presence of informed trading, thus indicating di¤erences in price
discovery.
Third, as mentioned in Eun and Sabherwal (2003), Canadian securities are listed in
the United States as ordinary shares, unlike securities from other countries which
are usually listed as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). The certicate for a
Canadian stock traded in the United States is identical to the one traded in Canada,
hence, there are no conversion fees. This suggests the U.S. and TSX prices of cross-
listed stocks are likely to move more closely to each other than the prices of ADRs
from other countries and their home-market securities.
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Macroeconomic News Announcements and
Price Discovery1
3.1 Introduction
In todays globalized nancial markets, nancial assets such as stocks, often trade
in multiple markets. In the case of cross-listed stocks, intermarket arbitrage should
keep the prices in the di¤erent markets from drifting apart. When new information
arrives it a¤ects the price of the asset in both markets. However, both markets
may react to the new information in a di¤erent way. This leads to the concept of
price discovery, which examines how well these markets process the information and
incorporate them into prices. Price discovery becomes particularly important when
new information arrives, because this is the time when the information process-
ing capacity of a market is most relevant, and reects the competitiveness of that
particular market.
One important point in time when new information arrives to the market is during
the release of macro-economic news. These news announcements provide indications
for the near-term policy changes that will subsequently be used by investors to price
1This chapter is based on Frijns, B., Indriawan, I., & Tourani-Rad, A. (2015). Macroeconomic
News Announcements and Price Discovery: Evidence from CanadianU.S. Cross-Listed Firms.
Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 32, pp. 35-48.
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securities. Since macroeconomic news announcements are pre-scheduled, the timing
of such releases is known, and investors may choose to trade on this information in
one or another market. This may lead to a temporal shift in price discovery between
markets which is related to the arrival of information from macroeconomic news
announcements. Although the impact of news announcements on security prices
has been studied extensively (see Andersen et al., 2007; Love and Payne, 2008;
and Nowak et al., 2011), and studies on price discovery of cross-listed securities
are abundant (see Hupperets and Menkveld, 2002; Pascual et al., 2006; Chen and
Choi, 2012), studies on the impact of news announcement on price discovery are
rare, especially when considering a multi-market setting. However, we can expect
a relationship between macroeconomic news announcements and price discovery,
because when news gets released, they a¤ect prices in one market which then leads
to movements in prices in other markets. In addition, we may expect that the shift
in price discovery is driven by the information processsing capacity of a market and
should not be a¤ected by the origin of the news (i.e. whether this information is
produced in the home or in the foreign market).
In this chapter, we investigate whether information released during scheduled news
announcements in one market leads to a shift in price discovery from one market to
another. We test this conjecture by comparing the Hasbrouck (1995) Information
Share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Permanent-Transitory (PT) decompo-
sition measures during days with scheduled macroeconomic news announcements
and days with no announcements. In particular, we assess Canadian stocks traded
in Canada and the U.S. In doing so, we consider Canadian as well as U.S. macro-
economic news. Particularly, we examine the extent to which macroeconomic news
announcements from either market contribute to the price discovery of Canadian
stocks listed in these two markets.
Our work has a number of novel features compared with previous studies. First, our
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study is the rst to analyze the impact of macroeconomic news on price discovery of
cross-listed stocks. Second, we assess both Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news,
compared with previous studies which only looked at the impact of announcements
in a single market. Third, we examine the relation between price discovery and
macroeconomic news announcements over a long period of time, from 2004-2011.
Our analysis leads to several interesting ndings. First, we observe that price dis-
covery shifts signicantly during macroeconomic news announcements. Second, the
U.S. market becomes more dominant in terms of price discovery, regardless of the
news country of origin. Third, we examine the relation between price discovery and
market microstructure variables. After controlling for liquidity shocks, we nd that
the impact of news announcements still persists. Intraday analyses of price discov-
ery on periods surrounding news releases further support these ndings, particularly
during Federal Funds Rate announcements. On the whole, our results suggest that
the U.S. market is better at processing information from macroeconomic news an-
nouncements.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses some of the rele-
vant literature on price discovery of cross-listed stocks and its linkage with macro-
economic news announcements. Section 3.3 describes the framework in deriving
the Vector Error Correction Model, as well as the Gonzalo and Granger (1995)
permanent-transitory decomposition and Hasbrouck (1995) information share mea-
sures. Section 3.4 looks at the selection of sample companies, and macroeconomic
news announcements. Section 3.5 reports the empirical ndings. Finally, section 3.6
concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
The main objective of this study is to assess whether information from macroeco-
nomic news releases contributes to the price discovery of stocks listed on multiple
exchanges. As such, we connect two strands of literature; namely, the price dis-
covery of cross-listed stocks and the impacts of macroeconomic news announcement
on security prices. While each of these topics has been studied separately in the
literature, the connection between them has received little attention.
Extant studies on price discovery suggest that the home market tends to lead price
discovery for cross-listed stocks, and this can be attributed to several market char-
acteristics. For instance, Lieberman, Ben-Zion, and Hauser (1999) investigate the
dominant-satellite relation of stocks listed on two international markets, Tel-Aviv
and New York. They nd that arbitrage opportunities are generally not available
and that usually, the domestic market emerges as the dominant one and the for-
eign market as the satellite one, particularly for international companies with large
volume and stock-holding. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine price discovery for
Canadian stocks that are cross-listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ in the
U.S., and nd that generally the Canadian market leads in terms of price discovery.
They further observe that the U.S. share of price discovery is directly related to the
U.S. share of trading, and inversely related to the ratio of bid-ask spreads. Pascual
et al. (2006) study the price discovery process of the Spanish stocks listed on the
Spanish Stock Exchange and cross-listed on the NYSE. They nd that the home
market leads in terms of price discovery which is attributable to its own trading
activity. Frijns et al. (2010) examine the price discovery of Australian and New
Zealand bilaterally cross-listed stocks, and nd that in both cases the home market
is dominant in terms of price discovery. However, they also observe that as rms
grow larger and their cost of trading in Australia declines, the Australian market
becomes more informative.
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It has further been documented that the arrival of information contributes to the
price discovery process between markets. Using volatility as a proxy for information
on the Bund futures contract, Martens (1998) shows that during volatile periods, the
share of volume in the London International Financial Futures Exchange decreases
while the share in price discovery process increases; whereas in quiet periods, the
Deutsche Terminbourse share of price discovery increases. Amin and Lee (2010)
document that the option markets share of price discovery increases relative to the
equity markets share prior to quarterly earnings announcements. This is mainly
due to the fact that option traders initiate a greater proportion of long and short
positions immediately before the dissemination of earnings news.
In this study, we use macroeconomic news announcements as a proxy for informa-
tion arrival. Macroeconomic news conveys price-relevant information and its release
time is predetermined. Security prices are a¤ected by adjustments in expectations to
the changing economic conditions driven by macroeconomic news announcements,
such as GDP output, employment and ination surprises, among others. Stud-
ies have shown that macroeconomic news announcements are linked to changes in
security prices. Andersen et al. (2003), for instance, list 25 important macroeco-
nomic variables and demonstrate the asset pricing impact (instantaneous response)
of macroeconomic announcements on exchange rates. They nd that high-frequency
exchange rate dynamics are linked to economic fundamentals. A similar reaction
is observed by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Boyd et al. (2005) who analyze
the stock markets, while Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Fleming and Remolona (1999)
analyze the bond market.
Since price discovery concerns the process of how information gets incorporated into
prices, changes in prices during macronews announcements could a¤ect the level of
price discovery. Indeed, several papers have investigated this link between price dis-
covery and macroeconomic news announcements. For instance, Mizrach and Neely
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(2008) examine price discovery in the U.S. Treasury futures market using data at
the one minute frequency during macroeconomic announcements in the period from
1997 to 2000. They nd weak evidence on the impact of announcements on price dis-
covery. Only in one out of four cases when news is released does the futures market
gain in terms of price discovery. They conclude that macroeconomic announcements
rarely explain price discovery independently of liquidity. Stronger evidence is pro-
vided by Taylor (2011) who observes an increase in information asymmetry and
price discovery around the release of key macroeconomic information. He assesses
the level of price discovery for S&P 500 index constituents over the period Janu-
ary to December of 2002 at the one minute frequency. He nds that the E-mini
futures market becomes more dominant during conditions of high liquidity and ex-
treme information asymmetry, i.e. during macroeconomic news releases. Phylaktis
and Chen (2010) investigate price discovery of the foreign exchange market during
macroeconomic news announcements. They estimate price discovery over time for
major trading banks in the U.K. and U.S. markets over the period January 1994
to December 1998. They nd that the top 10 trading banks information advan-
tage becomes prevalent, and their contribution to price discovery increases during
scheduled macroeconomic news.
Existing studies are limited to several asset classes, suchs as foreign exchange rates,
index funds, and Treasury futures. However, one can also expect a strong rela-
tionship between stock prices and macroeconomic news because businesses are con-
cerned about ination, industrial production, and the unemployment rate which is
conveyed in macroeconomic variables (McQueen and Roley, 1993). Existing studies
are limited to a single market context, while in reality, news a¤ect prices of stocks
listed in multiple markets. These points combined, provide an opportunity to in-
vestigate how macroeconomic news announcements contribute to price discovery of
cross-listed stocks.
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3.3 Methodology
In this section, we rst propose a model of stock price dynamics of cross-listed
stocks which builds on a vector error-correction. Subsequently, we compute Gon-
zalo and Granger (1995) permanent-transitory decomposition and Hasbrouck (1995)
information share to measure price discovery.
3.3.1 Error-Correction Model
The study of price discovery relies on the assumption that when a single security
trades in two di¤erent markets, prices in the two markets share a common e¢ cient
price, pt. Since prices in both markets are driven by the same underlying fundamen-
tals, the prices should be cointegrated. Therefore, the two I(1) observed transaction
price series y1;t and y2;t are cointegrated with cointegrating vector, 
0 = (1 -1). Sub-
sequently, 0yt = y1;t   y2;t, is a stationary process known as the error-correction
term. The Engle-Granger Representation Theorem states that a cointegrated system
can be expressed as an error-correction model of the following form,
yt = c+ 
0yt 1 +
NP
i=1
 iyt i + t; (3.1)
where yt is the (21) vector of log returns, c is a vector of constants,  is a
(21) vector that measures the speed of adjustment to the error-correction term
(i.e.  =
 
US
CAN

),  i are (22) matrices of AR coe¢ cients, and t is a (21) vector
of innovations. The VECM has two parts: the rst part, 0yt 1, represents the long-
run equilibrium between the price series. The second part,
NP
i=1
 iyt i, represents
the short-term dynamics induced by market imperfections.
The VECM has been used extensively to study price discovery of a security traded in
multiple markets. For example, Hasbrouck (1995) uses the VECM to estimate price
discovery of stocks traded on the NYSE and U.S. regional exchanges. Werner and
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Kleidon (1996) analyze market integration of British stocks cross-listed in the U.K.
and U.S. markets. Huang (2002) studies the price discovery of quotes in NASDAQ
market submitted by the electronic communication networks (ECNs) and by tradi-
tional market makers. Pascual et al. (2006) investigate the price discovery process
of Spanish cross-listed stocks in the NYSE during the daily (two-hour) overlapping
interval.
3.3.2 Price Discovery Measures
In this chapter, we use the VECM to compute the price discovery measures of Cana-
dian stocks cross-listed in the U.S. We follow two approaches: the Gonzalo Granger
(1995) permanent-transitory (PT) decomposition, and the Hasbrouck (1995) infor-
mation share (IS) measures. They are directly related and the results of both models
are primarily derived from the VECM.2
Gonzalo Granger (1995) Permanent-Transitory (PT) Decomposition
The PT measure is concerned with the permanent shocks that result in a disequilib-
rium as markets process news at di¤erent speeds. The PT measures each markets
contribution to the common factor, where the contribution is dened to be a function
of the markets error correction coe¢ cients; in this case, the speed of adjustment
coe¢ cients, . When a market dominates in terms of price discovery, its value of 
will be small, indicating that this market does not correct in response to any di¤er-
ences in prices between markets. Conversely, when a market is a satellite market, its
value of  will be large in absolute terms relative to the dominant market, indicating
strong adjustment to price di¤erences. If neither market is completely dominant,
2Baillie et al. (2002) explain that PT and IS provide similar results if the VECM residuals are
uncorrelated. However, if substantial correlation exists, the two measures usually yield di¤erent
results. While the PT measure is not a¤ected by contemporaneous correlation in the residuals, the
IS model is. Therefore it needs to be handled using Cholesky factorization, which requires that
the prices be ordered. This makes the IS results to be variable order dependent and Hasbrouck
(1995) suggests that di¤erent orders be used in order to calculate the upper and lower IS bounds
before they are averaged to arrive at a nal IS result.
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the magnitude of  will indicate the relative dominance between the two. The PT
can be computed using the following measure,
PTUS =
CAN
CAN + jUSj ; (3.2)
where US is negative, and CAN is positive given our  denition of (1 -1)0. This
ratio gives an indication of the degree of dominance of one market over the other.
A higher value of this ratio reects a greater feedback or contribution from the
US. Therefore, a PTUS of zero would imply that the NYSE does not contribute to
the price discovery of the stocks, whereas a PTUS greater than zero would imply
feedback from the NYSE to the TSX.
Hasbrouck (1995) Information Share
Hasbrouck proposes an alternative measure for price discovery  the information
share (IS). It measures the proportion of variance contributed by one market with
respect to the variance of the innovations in the common e¢ cient price. To assess
this, note that we can rewrite Equation (3.1) as a vector moving average (Wold
representation):
yt = 	(L)et; (3.3)
where 	(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator (	(L) = 1 +  1L +  2L
2 +
 3L
3+ :::). Following the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition, which states
that every (matrix) polynomial has permanent and transitory structure, we can
write Equation (3.3) in its integrated form as:
yt = 	(1)
tP
s=1
es +	
(L)et: (3.4)
where 	(1) is the sum of all moving average coe¢ cients, and measures the long-run
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impact of an innovation to the level of prices. Since prices are cointegrated, 0yt is
a stationary process, this implies that 0	(1) = 0, i.e. the long-run impact is the
same for all prices. If we denote  = ( 1 2) as the common row vector in 	(1),
Equation (3.4) becomes:
yt =  

tP
s=1
es

+	(L)et: (3.5)
Hasbrouck (1995) states that the increment  et in Equation (3.5) is the component
of price change that is permanently impounded into the price and is presumably due
to new information and decomposes the variance of the common factor innovations,
i.e., var( et) =  
 
0. The information share of a market is dened as the proportion
of variance in the common factor that is attributable to innovations in that market.
Since Hasbrouck (1995) uses the Cholesky factorization of 
 = MM 0 to handle
contemporaneous correlation, whereM is a lower triangular matrix, the information
share of market i is represented as:
Si =
([ M ]i)
2
 
 0
: (3.6)
We compute 	(1) in Equation (3.5) by calculating the product of the orthogonal
matrices of ? and ? (see Baillie et al., 2002),
	(1) = ?
0
?;
 = (0?(I  
kP
j=1
Aj)?)
 1; (3.7)
where I is a (22) identity matrix, and  is a scalar if there is only one common
factor in the system. Since  = (1 -1)0, we know that ? = (1 1)
0. Therefore,
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	(1) =
264  
 
375 = 
264 1 2
1 2
375 (3.8)
Where 1 and 2 are the elements of 
0
?. The lower triangular matrix, M given by
Cholesky factorization of 
 in Equation (3.6) can be expressed as:
M =
264 m11 0
m12 m22
375 =
264 1 0
2 2(1  2)1=2
375 (3.9)
Using Equation (3.5), (3.8), and (3.9) we can rewrite the information share as:
S1 =
(1m11 + 2m12)
2
(1m11 + 2m12)
2 + (2m22)
2
;
S2 =
(2m22)
2
(1m11 + 2m12)
2 + (2m22)
2
; (3.10)
where S1 denotes the upper bound of the information share of market 1 and S2
the lower bound of market 2. To get the lower bound for market 1 and the upper
bound for market 2, we reverse the order of 	(1) and M and recompute Equation
(3.10). Subsequently, we compute the midpoints to obtain the IS value as suggested
by Baillie et al. (2002).
3.4 Data Sources
3.4.1 Intraday Stock Returns Data
We collect data for 38 Canadian stocks which are traded on the TSX and the NYSE
for the period January 1, 2004 to January 31, 2011 (1,727 trading days). For the
U.S. market, we use the national best bid and ask quotes for stocks with the NYSE
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as primary listings and for the Canadian market, we use quotes posted at the TSX.
The end of the sample is chosen to avoid confounding e¤ects from the new Order
Protection Rule in Canada which became e¤ective on February 1, 2011 (see Clark,
2011). The stocks in our sample are simultaneously traded cross-listed pairs through
the sample period. Data are collected from the Thomson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH) database maintained by SIRCA.3 We obtain intraday quotes sampled at
a one-second frequency.4 Since sometimes trading in one of the markets starts
later than 9:30:00, we risk having missing data. Therefore, we omit the rst ve
minutes of the trading day. This leaves us to 23,100 observations per trading day per
company. Following Grammig et al. (2005), we use midpoints of quotes to study
price discovery as these are less a¤ected by the bid-ask bounce that is normally
observed in transaction prices. We also obtain intraday Canadian - U.S. Dollar
exchange rate quotes from TRTH and use the midpoint to convert prices into a
common currency to facilitate the specication of the error-term and ensure the
comparability of prices between the two markets, similar to Eun and Sabherwal
(2003) and Chen and Choi (2012). Hence, our analyses in this chapter are based on
the quote price series for each rm in the same currency, the U.S. dollar.5
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics for our sample consisting of 38 rms. We
report the market capitalization, average daily trade, and average percentage bid-
ask spread for each stock in both the U.S. and Canada. We also include the trading
and spread ratio of the U.S. market relative to the Canadian market. Our sample
covers a broad set of rms with market capitalization ranging from $558 million to
3Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacic.
4Fleming and Remolona (1999) indicate that more powerful tests of market e¢ ciency can be
carried out only by using intraday observations of nancial asset prices. Eun and Sabherwal (2003)
use quotes at 10-minute interval to assess price discovery in their study from February to July 1998,
while 1-minute interval is employed in Chen and Choi (2012) in their study from January 1998
to December 2000. Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) uses milisecond frequency to capture price
discovery in their 2007 study, albeit their sample are the most actively traded companies making
up the German main indexes. With these considerations, we postulate 1-second interval as the
optimal sampling frequency.
5We also conducted the analysis in Canadian dollars and found no signicant di¤erence in
results.
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$66 billion. It covers the less liquid stock such as Kingsway Financial Services with
average daily U.S. trades of 158 trades to a more liquid stock such as Barrick Gold
with average daily trades of 33,331 trades, with a sample average of 7,110 trades.
In Canada, the daily number of trades ranges from a minimum of 108 trades for
MI Developments Inc. to a maximum of 10,213 trades for Suncor Energy, with a
sample average of 4,179 trades. The trading ratio suggests that trading intensity is
higher in the U.S. than in Canada as shown by a ratio of 63%. The highest trading
ratio in the U.S. is Brookeld O¢ ce with 84% while the minimum is reported by
TransAlta Corp with 11%. The average daily percentage spread in both markets
is 0.12%, and the average spread ratio for the U.S. market as a proportion to the
Canadian market is 50%, suggesting that the cost of trading, on average, is about
the same in the U.S. and Canada.
We conduct the usual procedures of unit root and cointegration tests before estimat-
ing the PT and IS measures. To test for non-stationarity, we perform Augmented-
Dickey Fuller tests using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to select optimal lag
length. For all stocks, we cannot reject the presence of a unit root. Subsequently,
we conduct Johansens (1988) test for cointegration. In all tests, we reject the null
of no cointegration in favour of the alternative of one cointegrating vector. Since
the price series in our sample satisfy both conditions, we conclude that each pair of
our sample stocks is cointegrated.
3.4.2 Macroeconomic News Announcements
Table 3.2 lists the names, sources, time of release and the frequency of all the
macroeconomic news announcements considered in this study. We obtain the date,
time and the actual gures for the macroeconomic news announcements from their
respective websites as listed in the Appendix. For the Canadian market, we select
10 Canadian macroeconomic news releases (in line with studies such as Gravelle and
Moessner, 2001; Doukas and Switzer, 2004). Real GDP, Capacity Utilization Rate,
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and Current Account Balance are announced quarterly, Interest Rates are released
every 6 weeks, while the rest are released monthly. As for the U.S. announcements,
given the large number of data releases, we restrict our sample to the most relevant
22 items. This is in line with the literature in this area (see e.g. Balduzzi et al.,
2001; Andersen et al., 2003, 2007). From these major announcements, the GDP
related announcements are released quarterly, Fed Funds Rate is released every 6
weeks, and all the remaining announcements are released monthly.
3.5 Results
In this section, we present the results for the models proposed in Section 3.3. We
divide our analyses into two subsections. The rst subsection concerns the change
in daily level of price discovery caused by macroeconomic news announcements.
Specically, we compute the IS and PT for stocks during announcement and non-
announcement days over the sample periods. Then, we measure the di¤erence be-
tween the two sets. We examine the absolute changes in price discovery as well as
the directional changes. We further conduct a regression analysis and control for
the possible impact of liquidity during announcement times. The second subsec-
tion concerns the change in intraday price discovery during announcement times.
Using smaller intraday event windows on periods surrounding the announcements,
we implement similar tests to the rst subsection. These tests assess the impact of
macroeconomic news announcements on price discovery, the direction of the news
impact, the types of news (domestic vs foreign news), as well as the accuracy of the
time and model specications.
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Table 3.2: Macroeconomic news releases (January 2004 - January 2011)
This table provides a summary of the macroeconomic news announcements used in the study,
the total number of releases (Obs.), sources, the time of release using Eastern Standard Time
(EST), and the frequency of releases. * indicates that U.S. Personal Income and U.S. Personal
Consumption Expenditures have the same release dates. ** indicates that U.S. Business Inventories
release times varies from 8:30am and 10:00am. *** indicates that U.S. Industrial Production and
U.S. Capacity Utilization have the same release dates. Total U.S. and Canada announcements are
adjusted for overlapping days.
No Macroeconomic Announcement Obs Source EST Frequency
CAN Announcements
1 Real GDP 28 CANSIM 8:30 Quarterly
2 Capacity Utilization Rate 28 CANSIM 8:30 Quarterly
3 Current Account Balance 28 CANSIM 8:30 Quarterly
4 CPI 85 CANSIM 7:00 Monthly
5 Industrial Product Price 86 CANSIM 8:30 Monthly
6 Unemployment Rate 85 CANSIM 7:00 Monthly
7 Retail Sales 85 CANSIM 8:30 Monthly
8 Leading Indicators Index 85 CANSIM 8:30 Monthly
9 Housing Starts 57 CMHC 8:15 Monthly
10 Interest Rate 85 BoC 9:00 6-Week
US Announcements
11 GDP Advance 29 BEA 8:30 Quarterly
12 GDP Preliminary 28 BEA 8:30 Quarterly
13 GDP Final 28 BEA 8:30 Quarterly
14 Personal Income, Personal Consumption Expenditures* 85 BEA 8:30 Monthly
15 Trade Balance 85 BEA 8:30 Monthly
16 Nonfarm Payroll Employment 85 BLS 8:30 Monthly
17 PPI 85 BLS 8:30 Monthly
18 CPI 85 BLS 8:30 Monthly
19 Retail Sales 85 BC 8:30 Monthly
20 New Home Sales 85 BC 10:00 Monthly
21 Durable Goods Orders 85 BC 8:30 Monthly
22 Factory Orders 85 BC 10:00 Monthly
23 Business Inventories** 85 BC 8:30/10:00 Monthly
24 Construction Spending 85 BC 10:00 Monthly
25 Housing Starts 85 BC 8:30 Monthly
26 Consumer Condence Index 85 CB 10:00 Monthly
27 Chicago PMI 85 CB 9:45 Monthly
28 Leading Indicators Index 85 CB 10:00 Monthly
29 Industrial Production, Capacity Utilization*** 85 FRB 9:15 Monthly
30 Consumer Credit 85 FRB 15:00 Monthly
31 Government Budget 86 FMS 14:00 Monthly
32 Federal Funds Rate 57 FRB 14:15 6-Week
Total US and Canada Announcements (adjusted) 1297
Total Non-Announcement Days 430
Total Sample Days 1727
CANSIM = Statistics Canada
CMHC = Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation
BoC = Bank of Canada
BES = Bureau of Economic Analysis
BLS = Bureau of Labour Statistics
BC = Bureau of the Census
CB = Conference Board
FRB = Federal Reserve Bank
FMS = Financial Management Service
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3.5.1 Daily Price Discovery during Announcement and Non-
Announcement Days
To illustrate the importance of macroeconomic news announcements in understand-
ing the price discovery mechanism, we consider the relation between announcement
vs non-announcement days and the price discovery measures of the stocks. We
compute IS and PT daily. The VECM of Equation (3.1) is estimated by Ordinary
Least Squares with optimal lag length suggested by AIC. We di¤erentiate between
the IS and PT on non-announcement days and specic announcement days. The
di¤erence in IS and PT indicates market reactions to price discovery imposed by
news releases. We report the percentage change in IS and PT. Signicance tests are
based on t-statistics which are computed using paired-di¤erence test, and controlled
for possible heteroskedasticity using a Newey-West correction.
Absolute Di¤erence Test
Price discovery may shift in either direction for stocks listed in multiple markets,
especially when news may originate from either market. Therefore, the relative im-
pact of news on price discovery is not obvious. As discussed in Eun and Sabherwal
(2003), the TSX, as the home market stock exchange, is likely to contribute sub-
stantially to price discovery as it is in the securitys home market where substantial
information is expected to be produced. However, the dominance of the U.S. stock
exchanges as among the largest and most liquid exchanges in the world also suggests
that they are likely to contribute signicantly to price discovery. Such conicting
arguments do not provide us with a clear prior hypothesis on the directional impact
of news announcements. Therefore, we may observe price discovery shifts in either
directions.
Table 3.3 reports the di¤erence in price discovery between non-announcement and
announcement days for the period January 2004 to January 2011. The gures re-
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Table 3.3: Absolute change in price discovery during announcement days
This table provides the change in IS and PT for 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks during an-
nouncement days. The IS and PT are computed of daily averages, reported as the absolute
percentage di¤erence between IS and PT during announcement and non-announcement days,
j(IS(PT )Announcement IS(PT )Non Announcement)j
IS(PT )Non Announcement
. The gures under "Total" denote the number of
rms (out of 38 rms) showing signicant shift in Price Discovery during announcement times
at 5% signicance level obtained using the bootstrap procedure. Figures in parentheses are the
t-statistics. *** denotes signicance at 1% level.
January 2004 - January 2011 Panel A: Information Share (IS) Panel B: Component Share (PT)
Price Discovery Time Di¤ t-stat Total Di¤ t-stat Total
ALL Announcements 3.1%*** (17.1) 36.7 2.6%*** (18.73) 36.8
CAN Announcements 3.4%*** (8.94) 36.7 2.8%*** (9.87) 36.7
US Announcements 3.0%*** (14.91) 36.7 2.5%*** (16.15) 36.8
CAN Announcement
CPI 7:00 2.9%*** (8.59) 35 2.5%*** (8.6) 36
Labour Force Survey 7:00 3.2%*** (12.76) 36 2.3%*** (11.25) 38
Housing Starts 8:15 2.2%*** (7.34) 35 1.8%*** (8.63) 36
Real GDP 8:30 4.5%*** (8.95) 38 3.6%*** (7.98) 36
Capacity Utilization Rate 8:30 6.0%*** (9.6) 38 4.4%*** (10.57) 38
Current Account Balance 8:30 4.2%*** (7.14) 36 3.6%*** (6.46) 37
Industrial Price Index 8:30 2.0%*** (10.54) 37 1.7%*** (8.63) 37
Retail Sales 8:30 3.7%*** (10.49) 38 3.4%*** (10.93) 36
Leading Indicators Index 8:30 2.8%*** (10.45) 37 2.3%*** (9.1) 36
Interest Rate 9:00 2.7%*** (6.44) 37 2.3%*** (6.88) 37
US Announcement
GDP Advance 8:30 5.7%*** (8.09) 38 4.1%*** (7.09) 36
GDP Preliminary 8:30 3.9%*** (6.47) 34 3.4%*** (7.33) 38
GDP Final 8:30 3.7%*** (7.66) 37 3.4%*** (7.86) 36
Personal Income 8:30 2.6%*** (7.51) 38 1.7%*** (7.31) 37
Trade Balance 8:30 2.7%*** (8.48) 36 2.4%*** (8.96) 37
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 8:30 2.0%*** (7.13) 36 2.0%*** (8.44) 38
PPI 8:30 1.8%*** (6.62) 36 1.6%*** (7.17) 36
CPI 8:30 3.2%*** (7.17) 38 2.5%*** (7.58) 37
Retail Sales 8:30 1.8%*** (8.12) 36 1.6%*** (8.67) 37
Durable Goods Orders 8:30 2.8%*** (8.25) 36 2.1%*** (9.15) 36
Housing Starts 8:30 3.7%*** (9.54) 37 3.0%*** (11.94) 37
Industrial Production 9:15 3.7%*** (8.47) 38 2.9%*** (8.52) 37
Chicago PMI 9:45 2.5%*** (6.86) 38 2.0%*** (6.39) 34
New Home Sales 10:00 2.9%*** (8.35) 36 2.4%*** (7.58) 37
Factory Orders 10:00 2.2%*** (7.23) 38 1.8%*** (6.75) 35
Business Inventories 10:00 1.8%*** (10.2) 35 1.6%*** (8.39) 37
Construction Spending 10:00 4.3%*** (10.62) 38 3.8%*** (11.43) 38
Consumer Condence Index 10:00 2.8%*** (6.33) 36 2.2%*** (6.72) 38
Leading Indicators Index 10:00 2.7%*** (8.04) 37 2.6%*** (9.84) 37
Government Budget 14:00 3.2%*** (7.82) 37 2.8%*** (9.16) 37
Federal Funds Rate 14:15 2.9%*** (9.52) 36 2.3%*** (9.01) 36
Consumer Credit 15:00 2.41%*** (9.82) 36 2.0%*** (9.75) 38
ported are the absolute percentage di¤erences in IS and PT and their corresponding
t-statistics. It also reports the number of rms which signicantly cause shifts in
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IS and PT.6 On aggregate, macroeconomic news announcements cause a 3.1% shift
in IS, and a 2.6% shift in PT, respectively. Canadian announcements contribute to
3.4% (2.8%) shifts in IS (PT), while U.S. announcements lead to 3.0% (2.5%) shifts.
On average, more than 95% from a total of 38 rms in our sample react signicantly
to macroeconomic news announcements, causing signicant shifts in both IS and
PT.
Looking at individual announcements, we nd signicant shifts in price discovery
during all announcements. The number of rms which show signicant reactions is
also very high. These results strongly suggest that macroeconomic news announce-
ments a¤ect the level of price discovery between Canada and the U.S.
Directional Di¤erence Test
We examine the directional impact of news announcements on price discovery by
computing the percentage di¤erence in IS and PT during days with a specic an-
nouncement and non-announcement days. Table 3.4 reports the di¤erences in price
discovery during various announcement days and their corresponding t-statistics. It
also reports the number of rms with signicant reduction and increase in the IS
and PT measures.
Panel A in Table 3.4 presents the changes in U.S. IS during the di¤erent announce-
ment days. We observe that price discovery mainly shifts to the U.S. during days
with macroeconomic news announcements. On average, macroeconomic news an-
nouncements cause a signicant 1.1% increase in the U.S. IS, at 1% level signicance,
with an average of 24.3 rms signicantly showing increases in IS and 12.3 rms show
decreases. Canadian announcements contribute to a signicant 1.5% increase in IS,
and the U.S. announcements contribute to a 0.9% increase.
6We use Li and Maddalas (1997) stationary bootstrap method to resample the residuals. We
rst estimate the VECM model of Equation (3.1). The estimated parameters and residuals are
stored. The resampled residuals are then inserted back into the VECM. The VECM is-re-estimated
and the new IS and PT recalculated. We repeat the process 200 times.
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Table 3.4: Change in price discovery during announcement days
This table provides the change in U.S. IS and PT for 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks dur-
ing announcement days. The IS and PT are computed of daily averages, reported as the
percentage di¤erence between IS and PT during announcement and non-announcement days,
(IS(PT )Announcement IS(PT )Non Announcement)
IS(PT )Non Announcement
. The gures under "-"("+") denote the number of
rms (out of 38 rms) showing a decrease (increase) in U.S. Price Discovery during announcement
times at 5% signicance level obtained using the bootstrap procedure. Figures in parentheses are
the t-statistics. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
January 2004 - January 2011 Panel A: Information Share (IS) Panel B: Component Share (PT)
US Price Discovery Time Di¤ t-stat - + Di¤ t-stat - +
ALL Announcements 1.1%*** (3.45) 12.3 24.3 1.0%*** (3.73) 11.5 25.2
CAN Announcements 1.5%*** (2.39) 11.4 25.3 1.1%** (2.16) 10.9 25.8
US Announcements 0.9%*** (2.49) 12.8 23.9 0.9%*** (2.97) 11.8 25.0
CAN Announcement
CPI 7:00 2.4%*** (5.53) 5 30 1.9%*** (5.05) 6 30
Labour Force Survey 7:00 2.8%*** (7.78) 2 34 2.1%*** (7.86) 4 34
Housing Starts 8:15 0.5% (1.17) 14 21 0.6%* (1.66) 14 22
Real GDP 8:30 0.3% (0.31) 17 21 0.0% (-0.05) 16 20
Capacity Utilization Rate 8:30 4.7%*** (5.37) 6 32 3.6%*** (6.07) 4 34
Current Account Balance 8:30 -1.6%* (-1.91) 22 14 -1.8%*** (-2.45) 21 16
Industrial Price Index 8:30 -0.3% (-0.86) 21 16 0.0% (-0.06) 20 17
Retail Sales 8:30 3.7%*** (10.11) 2 36 3.3%*** (9.92) 1 35
Leading Indicators Index 8:30 1.7%*** (3.92) 9 28 1.6%*** (4.31) 9 27
Interest Rate 9:00 0.5% (0.87) 16 21 0.2% (0.5) 14 23
US Announcement
GDP Advance 8:30 -1.8% (-1.56) 24 14 -1.6%* (-1.83) 21 15
GDP Preliminary 8:30 0.4% (0.48) 14 20 0.3% (0.44) 18 20
GDP Final 8:30 1.0% (1.33) 11 26 1.8%*** (2.76) 8 28
Personal Income 8:30 -2.2%*** (-5.26) 28 10 -1.3%*** (-4.68) 29 8
Trade Balance 8:30 1.7%*** (3.58) 6 30 1.8%*** (4.83) 4 33
Nonfarm Payroll Employment 8:30 1.4%*** (3.69) 8 28 1.7%*** (5.8) 7 31
PPI 8:30 0.5% (1.23) 13 23 1.0%*** (3.31) 9 27
CPI 8:30 2.8%*** (5.33) 4 34 2.0%*** (4.89) 6 31
Retail Sales 8:30 0.4% (1.06) 17 19 0.6%* (1.95) 14 23
Durable Goods Orders 8:30 -1.0%* (-1.76) 24 12 -0.8%** (-2.12) 22 14
Housing Starts 8:30 3.2%*** (6.31) 3 34 2.6%*** (7.29) 4 33
Industrial Production 9:15 2.8%*** (4.8) 6 32 2.5%*** (5.9) 5 32
Chicago PMI 9:45 2.0%*** (4.63) 6 32 1.7%*** (4.68) 4 30
New Home Sales 10:00 2.0%*** (4.24) 6 30 2.0%*** (5.23) 6 31
Factory Orders 10:00 0.4% (0.88) 18 20 0.4% (0.92) 16 19
Business Inventories 10:00 0.5% (1.64) 14 21 0.8%*** (2.75) 12 25
Construction Spending 10:00 -3.4%*** (-5.73) 32 6 -3.1%*** (-6.45) 33 5
Consumer Condence Index 10:00 1.4%*** (2.42) 12 24 1.2%*** (2.63) 13 25
Leading Indicators Index 10:00 2.3%*** (5.74) 6 31 2.3%*** (6.85) 4 33
Government Budget 14:00 2.7%*** (5.43) 9 28 2.6%*** (7.28) 5 32
Federal Funds Rate 14:15 1.5%*** (2.81) 10 26 1.3%*** (3.32) 9 27
Consumer Credit 15:00 1.3%*** (3.19) 10 26 0.9%*** (2.56) 11 27
When we break down the di¤erent Canadian announcements, we nd that ve
macroeconomic announcements: Consumer Price Index, Labour Force Survey, Ca-
pacity Utilization Rate, Retail Sales and Leading Indicator Index signicantly in-
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crease the U.S. IS (decrease Canada IS). This is reected in the number of rms
which signicantly increase the U.S. IS as opposed to those which reduce it, as re-
ported in the third and fourth columns of Panel A. For example, the increase in IS
during Consumer Price Index announcements is caused by 30 of the rms in our
sample showing signicant increase in IS whereas only 5 rms show signicant de-
crease. Some of the largest increase in IS are during Canada Capacity Utilization
Rate announcements with 4.7%, followed by Retail Sales announcements with 3.7%,
and Labour Force Survey with 2.8%. This may indicate that these announcements
lead to more concentrated and intensive reaction from U.S. market players. Canada
Interest Rates announcements do not appear to be signicant. One possible ex-
planation may be the relative ease of predictability of the statistics by the market
players, since there has not been a su¢ cient degree of divergence between Cana-
dian and U.S. business cycles after the Bank of Canada began e¤orts to improve its
monetary policy transparency in the early to mid-1990s.
As for the U.S. announcements, we observe that a large number of announcements
signicantly increase the U.S. IS. The Fed Funds Rate announcements, as one of
the key macroeconomic variables, appear to lead to a signicant increase in IS.
Forward looking macroeconomic announcements such as Consumer Condence In-
dex, Chicago PMI, and Leading Indicator Index also report signicant increase in IS.
Housing Starts reports, which are used by analysts to help create estimates for other
consumer-based indicators, is also signicant. Another important macroeconomic
variable is the Trade Balance. It has been documented that small open economies
are a¤ected by international economic developments, especially by large countries
with which they have important relationships in international trade.7 Therefore, it
is not surprising if an open economy like Canada with a strong trade and capital
market links with the United States is a¤ected by developments in the U.S. economy.
7Campbell and Lewis (1998) show that Australian xed-income markets are signicantly af-
fected by U.S. macroeconomic news.
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Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the PT results. They are very similar to those of the
IS results in Panel A. The correlation coe¢ cient between the IS and PT measures
is 0.978, which conrms our earlier nding. On average, macroeconomic announce-
ments cause a signicant 1.0% increase in PT, with a 1.1% increase contributed by
the Canadian announcements and 0.9% increase by the U.S. announcements. Over-
all, price discovery shifts to the U.S. during macroeconomic news announcements.
To further assess the robustness of our results, we conduct a regression analysis,
controlling for possible exogenous variables as discussed in the next section.
Daily Regression Analysis
Jiang et al. (2011) suggest that liquidity shocks, such as changes in the bid-ask
spread and market depth during macroeconomic news announcements have signi-
cant predictive power for changes in security prices. Moreover, Mizrach and Neely
(2008) nd that market liquidity contributes signicantly to the level of IS and PT
during announcement times. With these considerations, we construct a model us-
ing dummy variables as a proxy for announcement days to test for the impact of
announcements, controlling for liquidity e¤ect. In doing so, we rst construct series
using daily IS and PT, and estimate the following model:
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where PDUSt represents the daily U.S. IS or PT, N
US
t and N
CAN
t are the daily
number of trades in the U.S. and Canada, SUSt and S
CAN
t are the daily average
percentage spreads in both markets, Time is a simple linear trend, and Dt is the
announcement day dummy which takes on a value of 1 during an announcement
day, or 0 during non-announcement day. We estimate the coe¢ cients using rm
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Table 3.5: Regression on daily price discovery
This table reports the estimates of Equation (3.11). The dependent variable is the Ratio IS (PT)
which is the daily log ratio of U.S. share of IS (PT) relative to Canada. Time denotes a linear time
trend, Ratio Trade and Ratio Spread denote the log ratio of U.S. trades relative to Canada, and
the log ratio of percentage spread in the U.S. relative to Canada, respectively. All Announcements
denotes a dummy variable for days with macroeconomic news releases. US Announcements and
CAN Announcements each represents a dummy variable for U.S. and Canadian macroeconomic
news, respectively. Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics controlled
using clustered standard error. *** denotes signicance at 1% level.
Panel A: Ratio IS Panel B: Ratio PT
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -1.30*** -1.30*** -1.19*** -1.19***
(-3.19) (-3.19) (-3.31) (-3.31)
Time 0.00084*** 0.00084*** 0.00083*** 0.00083***
(9.02) (9.02) (10.9) (10.9)
Ratio Trade 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(5.4) (5.4) (3.16) (3.16)
Ratio Spread -1.10*** -1.10*** -1.03*** -1.03***
(-3.07) (-3.07) (-3.1) (-3.1)
All Announcements 0.036*** 0.031***
(4.82) (4.84)
US Announcements 0.036*** 0.031***
(4.42) (4.65)
CAN Announcements 0.035*** 0.032***
(4.35) (4.03)
R sq(Adj) 0.491 0.491 0.447 0.447
xed e¤ects estimator with clustered standard errors.
Table 3.5 illustrates the linkage between microstructure variables and the price dis-
covery estimates. For both the IS and PT, the announcement day dummy variable
strongly explains the increase in price discovery. Even after separating the Cana-
dian and U.S. announcements as shown in the second column of each panel, the
result still holds strongly. This suggests that the U.S. market becomes more infor-
mative not only during days with Canadian macroeconomic news announcements,
but also during days with U.S. news announcements. There also appears to be a
strong time trend e¤ect as captured by the Time variable. Ratio Trade is positive
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and highly signicant, implying that an increase in relative number of trades in the
U.S. increases the U.S. portion of price discovery. This is consistent with Engle and
Lange (2001) who nd that a large price adjustment is normally driven by trades.
Ratio Spread is negative and also highly signicant which suggests price premium
in the U.S. (represented by the increase in relative spread in the U.S.) lowers the
U.S. portion of price discovery. This is in line with Fleming et al. (1996) who indi-
cate that informed traders will transact in the market with the lowest transaction
costs in order to maximise prots generated from trading on their information. The
R2(adj) from Equation (3.11) range from 49.1% for the IS model to 44.7% for the
PT model. We conclude that macroeconomic news announcements and standard
liquidity measures strongly capture the daily uctuations in price discovery between
Canada and the U.S.
3.5.2 Intraday Price Discovery
We also test the impact of announcements using smaller event windows, particularly
on periods surrounding news releases. Several studies show that prices adjust within
minutes of the announcement (see Fleming and Remolona, 1999; Nowak et al.,
2011; Scholtus et al., 2014). Such an immediate and short-lived e¤ect would not be
picked up in a daily estimation. We therefore investigate the news e¤ect using a 20-
minute time window (10 minutes pre and post) surrounding a specic announcement.
We select this window to enable us to capture the impact of news which occurs
earlier than the o¢ cially scheduled time.8 This may cause prices and therefore price
discovery measures to adjust before the announcements and then continue to a¤ect
the news interpretation.
We focus on U.S. announcements (10 in total) which occur after the stock market
opens at 9:30 AM in both markets. There are no Canadian announcements after
8Scholtus et al. (2014) point out that although, on average, macroeconomic news arrivals are
reasonably punctual, substantial di¤erences can be found across the di¤erent announcements.
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Table 3.6: Absolute change in price discovery surrounding news releases (20-minute
window)
This table provides the change in IS and PT for 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks during an-
nouncement days. The IS and PT are computed on 20 minutes surrounding the announce-
ment times; 10 minutes prior and 10 minutes after. The gures reported are the absolute per-
centage di¤erences in 20 minutes IS and PT during announcement and non-announcement days
j(IS(PT )Announcement IS(PT )Non Announcement)j
IS(PT )Non Announcement
. The gures under "Total" denote the number of
rms (out of 38 rms) showing signicant shift in Price Discovery during announcement times
at 5% signicance level obtained using the bootstrap procedure. Figures in parentheses are the
t-statistics. *** denotes signicance at 1% level.
January 2004 - January 2011 Panel A: Information Share (IS) Panel B: Component Share (PT)
Price Discovery Time Di¤ t-stat Total Di¤ t-stat Total
All Announcements 4.9%*** (6.34) 35.7 3.6%*** (8.15) 34.8
Chicago PMI 9:45 4.3%*** (6.38) 35 3.6%*** (7.36) 36
US New Home Sales 10:00 4.0%*** (6.35) 36 3.1%*** (7.9) 37
US Factory Orders 10:00 3.4%*** (7.72) 35 2.5%*** (8.14) 36
US Business Inventories 10:00 4.0%*** (7.47) 35 3.0%*** (8.64) 35
US Construction Spending 10:00 5.2%*** (6.46) 37 3.3%*** (5.4) 34
US Consumer Condence Index 10:00 4.7%*** (8.14) 36 3.1%*** (8.1) 36
US Leading Indicators Index 10:00 3.5%*** (9.7) 36 2.6%*** (8.78) 33
US Government Budget 14:00 4.6%*** (9.99) 36 3.4%*** (8.47) 32
Federal Funds Rate 14:15 11.8%*** (9.68) 37 7.3%*** (10.65) 35
US Consumer Credit 15:00 4.1%*** (6.76) 34 3.6%*** (7.84) 34
the opening time. We rst construct a price series by selecting the 20-minute data
(1200 observations) surrounding the news release on a particular announcement day.
Based on this series, the VECM model is estimated on a daily basis and the IS and
PT computed.
Table 3.6 presents the absolute di¤erence in price discovery during non-announcement
and various announcement days. Panel A and B in Table 3.5 present the IS and
PT over the di¤erent announcement days, respectively. On average, macroeconomic
news announcements cause a 4.9% shift in IS and a 3.6% shift in PT. These numbers,
as expected, are larger than those of the daily coe¢ cients. Looking at the number
of rms, the IS (PT) measure reports 35.7 (34.8) rms with signicant shifts in price
discovery. For the individual announcements, we nd signicant shifts in the IS and
PT during all ten announcements. Fed Funds Rate announcement in particular,
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Table 3.7: Change in price discovery surrounding news releases (20-minute window)
This table provides the change in U.S. IS and PT for 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks during
announcement days. The IS and PT are computed on 20 minutes surrounding the announce-
ment times; 10 minutes prior and 10 minutes after. The gures reported are the percent-
age di¤erences in 20 minutes IS and PT during announcement and non-announcement days
(IS(PT )Announcement IS(PT )Non Announcement)
IS(PT )Non Announcement
. The gures under "-"("+") denote the number of
rms (out of 38 rms) showing a decrease (increase) in U.S. Price Discovery during announcement
times at 5% signicance level obtained using the bootstrap procedure. Figures in parentheses are
the t-statistics. *, **, and *** denotes signicance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Information Share (IS) Panel B: Component Share (PT)
US Price Discovery Time Di¤ t-stat - + Di¤ t-stat - +
All Announcements 2.4%** (2.18) 11.9 23.8 1.4%** (2.2) 13.5 21.3
Chicago PMI 9:45 3.5%*** (4.45) 5 30 2.1%*** (3.05) 10 26
US New Home Sales 10:00 2.7%*** (3.37) 8 28 1.8%*** (3.22) 7 30
US Factory Orders 10:00 0.4% (0.61) 15 20 -0.1% (-0.17) 18 18
US Business Inventories 10:00 -0.4% (-0.46) 21 14 -0.3% (-0.42) 20 15
US Construction Spending 10:00 2.3%** (2.11) 12 25 1.5%* (1.89) 13 21
US Consumer Condence Index 10:00 2.1%** (2.35) 14 22 0.8% (1.26) 18 18
US Leading Indicators Index 10:00 1.1%* (1.75) 12 24 0.6% (1.22) 17 16
US Government Budget 14:00 -1.0% (-1.17) 22 14 -0.5% (-0.68) 17 15
Federal Funds Rate 14:15 11.6%*** (9.12) 1 36 6.3%*** (6.78) 5 30
US Consumer Credit 15:00 1.8%** (2.14) 9 25 1.2%* (1.73) 10 24
leads to a very large shift in both IS and PT.
As for the directional impact of announcements, the results are reported in Table
3.7. For the information share, Panel A shows that, on average, the announcements
lead to a 2.4% increase in IS. For 7 out of 10 announcements, the information share
shifts to the U.S. The magnitudes of the gures are higher than the gures for daily
estimation as reported in Table 3.3. For example, Chicago PMI reports an increase
in IS by 3.5% at the intraday level as compared to 2.0% at the daily level. New
Home Sales announcement leads to an increase in IS by 2.7% as opposed to 2.0%,
while Construction Spending leads to an increase in IS by 2.3% as opposed to -3.4%.
These results suggest that the smaller event window allow us to pick up stronger
price formation process as well as more precise reaction which may not be captured
accurately in daily estimation. Another interesting nding is that U.S. IS increases
by 11.6% during Fed Funds Rate announcements. This indicates a strong reaction
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Table 3.8: Regression on intraday price discovery
This table reports the estimates of Equation (3.11). The dependent variable is the Ratio IS (PT)
which is the daily log ratio of U.S. share of IS (PT) relative to Canada. The IS and PT are
computed on 20 minutes surrounding the announcement times. Time denotes a linear time trend,
Ratio Trade and Ratio Spread denote the log ratio of U.S. trades relative to Canada, and the log
ratio of percentage spread in the U.S. relative to Canada, respectively. All Announcements denotes
a dummy variable for days with macroeconomic news which are released after 9:30AM. Figures in
parentheses are heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics controlled using clustered standard error.
*, and *** denotes signicance at 10% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Ratio IS Panel B: Ratio PT
Constant -2.04*** -1.71***
(-16.37) (-16)
Time 0.0037*** 0.0037***
(10.23) (11.75)
Ratio Trade 0.32*** 0.076***
(7.92) (2.42)
Ratio Spread -1.66*** -1.57***
(-30.33) (-31.23)
All Announcements 0.079* 0.054*
(1.83) (1.77)
R sq(Adj) 0.273 0.272
from market players in the U.S. towards interest rates releases. As for the PT, the
average increase is 1.4%, with only 5 out of 10 announcements showing a signicant
increase. Fed Funds Rate show a consistent and signicant increase of 6.3%.
We re-estimate Equation (3.11) at the intraday level on a 20-minute window and
report the results in Table 3.8. Similar to our previous nding, Announcement time
dummy is positive and signicant at 10% level for both the IS and PT models.
This suggests that the impact of macroeconomic news announcements is not only
observable at daily, but also intraday level. This result further conrms our previ-
ous ndings that the U.S. market becomes more informative during the release of
macroeconomic news announcements. Time trend and liquidity shocks contribute
signicantly to the level of IS and PT during announcement times. An increase
in relative trade in the U.S. increases the IS and PT while an increase in relative
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spread in the U.S. decreases them. The R2(adj) range from 27.3% for the IS model
to 27.2% for the PT model. Overall, we can conclude that price discovery shifts to
the U.S. during macroeconomic news announcements, and our ndings are robust
to model and time specications.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examine the impact of macroeconomic news announcements on
the price discovery of Canadian stocks listed in Canada and in the U.S. Using a
sample of 38 Canadian stocks listed on the TSX that are also listed in the U.S.
market with the NYSE as primary listing, we measure price discovery over the pe-
riod January 2004 to January 2011. We assess the contribution of macroeconomic
news by comparing the level of price discovery during days with and without an-
nouncements. We also assess when the news originates either from Canada or the
U.S.
Our analyses yield several important ndings. First, we observe that price discovery
shifts for most of the rms in our sample during news announcement days. Second,
both Canadian and U.S. macroeconomic news announcements lead to price discov-
ery shifts towards the U.S. as represented by signicant increases in U.S. IS and
PT. Third, the impact of news announcements remains strong even after control-
ling for time trends and liquidity shocks. These ndings are further supported by
intraday analyses of price discovery on periods surrounding news releases. On the
whole, we nd that the U.S. market sees an increase in price discovery relative to
the Canadian market during announcement times, thus implying the di¤erence in
information processing capability between the two markets, particularly with regard
to the processing of market-wide information.
Our results have several important implications. First, for nancial markets, our
ndings suggest a decline in the importance of the Canadian market during macro-
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economic news announcements time. The U.S. market seems to be better at process-
ing information from macroeconomic news. Second, the fact that Canadian an-
nouncements lead to the same price discovery shift to the U.S. as the U.S. announce-
ments indicates that Canadian market participants actually put less emphasis on
domestic macroeconomic news releases than U.S. market participants. Finally, the
signicant increase in the trading ratio and the decrease in the spread ratio of the
U.S. markets relative to the Canadian markets suggest that the U.S. markets, as
the larger and the more liquid exchange of the two, is the preferred destination for
traders who seek liquidity and cheaper trading options.
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The Dynamics of Price Discovery
4.1 Introduction
One central function of nancial markets is price discovery, which is often interpreted
as the process by which prices impound new information (Madhavan, 2000). Price
discovery is important because it determines not only how prices are formed in a
market, but also how well a market gathers, interprets, and incorporates information
into prices. When an asset lists in multiple markets, price discovery plays an even
more important role as information can be incorporated into prices in any of these
markets. In such a case, the market which incorporates new information into prices
faster has better information processing capacity than other markets, and leads in
terms of price discovery. Thus, in a multi-market context, price discovery reects
one form of competitiveness of a market relative to others, and may indicate in
which market investors prefer to trade.
Given the importance of price discovery in a multi-market setting, it is crucial for
exchanges and market regulators to understand which market contributes more to
price discovery, and how such a market can improve its competitiveness. To this
end, there have been several studies which show that price discovery predominantly
occurs in the home market because it is the market where most information about
the company is generated (see e.g. Lieberman et al.,1999; Hupperets and Menkveld,
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2002; Grammig et al., 2005). Underlying such an argument is some degree of market
segmentation where investors cannot easily exploit information in any other market
but their own. Those studies, therefore, assume that price discovery does not change
over time with the home market being the leader in terms of price discovery.
Contrary to the above studies, price discovery may shift from one market to an-
other over time due to many factors.1 For instance, investors have the tendency
to trade in the cheaper and more liquid market. Such liquidity-motivated trading
may cause information clustering in a market, which may lead to a shift in price
discovery (Admati and Peiderer, 1988). Furthermore, the automation of trading
activity helps investors scan public information faster and trade on this information.
Such speed and intensity of trading activity may lead to changes in price discovery
between markets (Abergel et al., 2012). This evidence indicates that the information
processing capacity of a market may not be constant over time.
Currently, a clear understanding of how price discovery between markets changes
over time and what drives such dynamics, is lacking. For example, it is yet to be
explored whether price discovery is persistent over time, whether the dynamics of
price discovery is attributable to changes in market liquidity, and whether algorith-
mic trading (AT) activities a¤ect the dynamics of price discovery.2 To address these
issues, studying price discovery over a longer time period is necessary. Existing
studies tend to examine price discovery at one point in time over a certain period,
which typically is relatively short.3 As such, these studies lean towards explaining
cross-sectional di¤erences in price discovery and determinants of those di¤erences,
rather than the dynamics of price discovery over time. The importance of studying
1In Chapter 3, we show, for example, that price discovery shifts from Canada to the U.S. with
the arrival of macroeconomic news.
2In this study, we do not distinguish between algorithmic and high-frequency traders. As
such, we use the terms "algorithmic trading" and "high-frequency trading" interchangeably. The
explanation can be found in Section 4.3 where we dene our AT proxy.
3For instance, Pascual et al. (2006) study Spanish rms cross-listed on the NYSE in the year
2000. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) study Canadian rms cross-listed on the NYSE from February
to July 1998, while Chen and Choi (2012) use data from January 1998 to December 2000.
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price discovery over longer periods is further emphasized by the changing nancial
market landscape as a result of, for example, regulatory changes. One such change
is the adoption of regulation National Market Services (Reg. NMS) in the U.S.
In this chapter, we assess the dynamics of price discovery of Canadian stocks traded
in Canada and the U.S. Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. First,
by measuring Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger
(1995) permanent-transitory (PT) decomposition daily over time, we explore trends
and persistence in price discovery, issues that have not yet been explored in a multi-
market context. This also allows us to examine whether the adoption of Reg NMS in
the U.S. a¤ected the dynamics of price discovery. Second, we assess how measures
of price discovery, liquidity, and AT activity interact with each other over longer
periods. Our analyses shed light on what drives price discovery between markets
(i.e. whether changes in relative liquidity and AT activity a¤ect the contribution
to price discovery of a market), as well as the importance of price discovery for a
market (i.e. whether an improvement in price discovery a¤ects liquidity and AT
activity).4 These ndings are valuable for exchanges as they indicate what areas ex-
changes would need to focus on to improve price discovery. Third, from an empirical
perspective, we model the interactions between price discovery measures, liquidity,
and AT activity using a vector autoregression (VAR). We estimate both a reduced-
form and a structural VAR that uses the identication through heteroskedasticity
approach developed by Rigobon (2003) and recently implemented by Chaboud et al.
(2014). In contrast to the reduced-form Granger causality tests, which measure pre-
dictive relationships, the structural VAR estimation allows for identication of the
contemporaneous interactions among the variables, while at the same time, taking
4The analysis of the impact of AT activity on price discovery is especially relevant given that
AT activity proliferated in the U.S. and Canada at di¤erent times, hence price discovery between
the two markets may have changed over time. In the U.S., high-frequency trading (HFT), a subset
of AT, became especially popular in 2007 and 2008 (Rogow, 2009). By 2009, 26 HFTs participate
in 68.5% of the dollar volume traded on average (Brogaard, 2010). Gibbs (2007) explains that
U.S. players will continue to dominate the market because while Canadian traders ramp up their
algorithmic capabilities, they tend to partner with U.S. broker-dealers to leverage their o¤erings.
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into account the possible endogeneity among them.5
Applying our model to Canadian stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)
and cross-listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) over the period January
2004 to January 2011, we document several important ndings. First, we observe
that over time, the U.S. market is gaining in terms of price discovery. Second, we
nd that several measures of liquidity are related to price discovery. Improvements
in liquidity (an increase in trading volume and a decrease in e¤ective spread) in-
crease an exchanges contribution to price discovery. This impact is incorporated
instantaneously as well as with a protracted lag. Conversely, we nd that an in-
crease in price discovery leads to improved liquidity. Third, we nd that relative
algorithmic trading activity is negatively related to price discovery. This nding is
in line with the literature on negative externalities of high-frequency trading. Par-
ticularly, as arbitrageurs use computer algorithms to trade aggressively and compete
for latency arbitrage opportunity that exists in the market, they cause a crowding-
out e¤ect. Consequently, high-frequency trading by these arbitrageurs pushes away
informed investors, who are disadvantaged in terms of speed. Finally, we nd that
the dynamics of price discovery persist even after we account for the adoption of
Reg. NMS in the U.S. Overall, our ndings highlight the importance of liquidity
for exchanges in order to improve price discovery, as well as the importance of price
discovery to attract more investors. AT activity by arbitrageurs should be of interest
to exchange o¢ cials as the crowding out e¤ect may push investors away to trade in
another market.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the studies on
the determinants of price discovery and how our work di¤ers to existing studies. In
5The identication through heteroskedasticity approach was recently applied in several nance
studies. For example, Chaboud et al. (2014) use the approach to identify the contemporaneous
causal impact of AT on triangular arbitrage opportunities. Ehrmann et al. (2011) use the same
approach to assess international transmission of shocks between money, bond, equity and foreign
exchange markets. Andersen et al. (2007) use similar model to assess contemporaneous spillover
e¤ects among U.S., German and British stock, bond and foreign exchange markets during U.S.
macroeconomic news announcements.
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Section 4.3, we discuss the data and descriptive statistics, as well as our measures
of liquidity and AT activity. We explain our measures for price discovery as well
as the formal measures for assessing dynamics in price discovery in Section 4.4. In
Section 4.5, we report our ndings. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
A markets contribution to price discovery may change over time for various reasons.
In this section, we rst discuss factors that may contribute to the change in price
discovery over time. We then show how these factors can be modeled to assess the
dynamics of price discovery in a dual-market scenario.
There has been a growing literature examining price discovery of cross-listed stocks.
The majority of it focuses on the determinants of price discovery, with liquidity
playing an important role. As discussed in Admati and Peiderer (1988), one of
the motives for trade in nancial markets is liquidity. Given that investors have
discretion over where and when to trade, they have the tendency to trade in a cheaper
and more liquid market, i.e. when the market is "thick" and their trading has little
e¤ect on prices. Such market may attract more traders, leading to information
clustering and a shift in price discovery.
One type of liquidity, which is important for price discovery, is trading volume. We
often observe that large trades have persistent price impacts, with trade prices lower
after large sales and higher after large purchases. One possible explanation is that
increased volume reects a greater likelihood that demand for a stock comes from
informed traders (Stickel and Verrechia, 1994). Consequently, investors interpret
high volume as an indication that the demand underlying a price change is informa-
tive, and therefore should get incorporated into prices. Consistent with this view,
Hasbrouck (1995) nds a positive and statistically signicant relation between the
relative trading volume of a sample of 30 Dow stocks and the NYSEs contribu-
54
Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Price Discovery
tion to price discovery. He explains that markets di¤er in their ability to process
information such as that coming from trades. A market which has an informative
trading process can shed light on the interpretation of public information, and there-
fore, leads in terms of price discovery. Similarly, Pascual et al. (2006) nd that a
markets relative contribution to the price discovery process is related to its trading
activity. Using Spanish stocks that are cross-listed on the NYSE, they nd that the
Spanish Stock Exchange leads in terms of price discovery due to its large trading
activity relative to the NYSE as the satellite market.
Another important determinant of price discovery is the relative bid-ask spread. A
market with narrower spreads creates incentives for traders to transact. As a result,
trading may be concentrated in that market relative to in other markets. This
may a¤ect a markets contribution to price discovery. Eun and Sabherwal (2003)
suggest that the lower spread on U.S. exchanges relative to the TSX represents a
competitive threat faced by the TSX liquidity providers from their U.S. counterpart.
The TSX liquidity providers who face more competition from the U.S. liquidity
providers are likely to be more responsive to U.S. prices. The importance of spread
on price discovery is also documented in Harris et al. (2002) who compare the bid-
ask spread and a measure of price discovery for the years 1988, 1992, and 1995 for
30 Dow stocks. They nd that the NYSEs contribution to price discovery relative
to the regional exchanges increases when its spreads relative to the regional markets
decline. In addition, Chen and Choi (2012) assess di¤erential private information
for Canadian stocks traded in Canada and the U.S. They document that the TSX
has more informed trades and a larger information share which they attribute to
the small but positive premiums in New York.
In addition to liquidity, algorithmic trading (AT) activity has also been linked to
price discovery. However, the results are mixed. Academic work using earlier data
documents a positive relation between AT and price discovery. For example, Hen-
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dershott et al. (2011) assess the impact of quote automation in the NYSE from
December 2002 through July 2003. Using proxy to measure the share of AT in the
market, they nd that for large stocks in particular, AT enhances the informative-
ness of quotes by more quickly resetting their quotes after news arrivals. Riordan
and Storkenmaier (2012) use Deutsche Boerse data from February to June 2007 to
study the e¤ect of a latency reduction on price discovery through the introduction
of Xetra 8.0 trading platform upgrade. They nd that the contribution of quotes
to price discovery doubles to 90% post upgrade, indicating that prices are more ef-
cient. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) use NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH data in the last
quarter of 2007 and nd that high-frequency trading improves liquidity and price
e¢ ciency.
A more recent group of studies suggest that an increase in AT may lead to a decline
in price discovery. Stein (2009) explains that recent technological advancements al-
low traders to detect and exploit price discrepancies between securities in a fraction
of a millisecond. These developments have led to the stock market being dominated
by sophisticated professionals using extensive quantitative nancial models. As a
consequence, aggressive investment strategies by these traders have led to a crowd-
ing out e¤ect that pushes prices away from their fundamental values, i.e. prices
becoming less informative. Gai et al. (2014) explain that since U.S. stock markets
observe price, display, and time priority, it is the relative speed but not the absolute
speed that matters. This induces economic incentive not only to invest in speed but
also to slow down other traders, which is in line with the "quote stu¢ ng" argument
of Biais and Wooley (2011) and Foucault et al. (2013) that HFT submits a pro-
fuse number of orders to generate market congestion on purpose. In this respect,
Egginton et al. (2014) show that by submitting large numbers of orders that are can-
celed very quickly, a high-frequency trader may create exploitable latency arbitrage
opportunities. Kozhan and Tham (2012) show that as computers enter the same
trade at the same time to exploit an arbitrage opportunity, high-frequency trading
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by arbitrageurs causes a crowding out e¤ect. Therefore, in contrast to the com-
mon notion that competition improves price e¢ ciency, they nd that competition
among arbitrageurs limits e¢ ciency because competing arbitrageurs inict negative
congestion externalities to nancial markets.6
While there are currently no studies that have looked at how AT activity a¤ects price
discovery of cross-listed stocks, there are a few studies which have looked at how
liquidity a¤ects price discovery. However, these studies are predominantly cross-
sectional studies or look at time-variation only on an annual basis. For example,
Harris et al. (2002) study price discovery using a sample of 30 Dow stocks for
the years 1988, 1992, and 1995. They calculate di¤erences in price discovery from
one year to the next, and relate these di¤erences to changes in the relative spreads
between the NYSE and the U.S. regional exchanges. Their ndings suggest that
higher NYSE spreads reduce the NYSE contribution to price discovery. Frijns et
al. (2010) measure price discovery annually for four Australian stocks cross-listed in
New Zealand and ve New Zealand stocks cross-listed in Australia from 2002 to 2007.
Using a total of 54 observations, they regress Hasbrouck (1995) information share
on several variables such as the log number of trades in each market, the percentage
bid-ask spread in each market, and the log of the market capitalization. They
indicate that the growth in the importance of the Australian market is positively
related to the growth in the size of the rm and negatively related to the size of the
percentage spread in the Australian market. Similarly, Frijns et al. (2015) measure
price discovery annually from 1996 to 2011 for Canadian stocks which are cross-listed
on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX. Their study examines, in particular, the issue
of endogeneity between price discovery and measures of liquidity and market quality.
Our work extends the above studies by focusing on the dynamics of price discovery.
6Biais et al. (2015) nd that the improvement in trading speed can either increase or decrease
social wefare. In line with this argument, Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) explain that the impact
of latency on social welfare depends on the initial level of speed. Particularly, allowing venues to
compete on speed improves welfare if the default speed is relatively low, but decreases welfare once
the default speed reaches a certain threshold.
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Specically, we assess, at daily frequency, how measures of price discovery, trading
volume, bid-ask spread, and AT activity of the U.S. relative to the Canadian markets
interact with each other over longer periods. We acknowledge that these variables
may be determined simultaneously. For instance, improvements in liquidity and
AT activity may lead to a higher contribution to price discovery, while at the same
time, higher price discovery may lead to improvements in liquidity and AT activity.
To accommodate such relationships, we employ a structural VAR that models the
interaction between the variables. We follow Chaboud et al. (2014) and account
for possible contemporaneous interactions among the VAR variables using the iden-
tication through heteroskedasticity approach developed by Rigobon (2003). The
variables and methodologies will be discussed in the following sections.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our sample consists of Canadian stocks that are traded on the TSX and NYSE
from January 2004 through January 2011. The end of the sample is chosen to avoid
confounding e¤ects from the adoption of the consolidated tape in Canada (see Clark,
2011). Data are collected from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database
maintained by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacic (SIRCA). These
Canadian stocks are traded in both markets throughout the sample period, had no
stock splits, and have data available from TRTH. In total, there are 38 stocks which
meet these criteria.7
We collect intraday data on trade price, trade volume, and the bid and ask quotes at
a second and at a millisecond frequency. We use the data at a one-second frequency
7We also conduct analysis using a more stringent screening by imposing a minimum message
count following the approach of Hasbrouck and Saar (2013). A rm is excluded from the sample if
more than 10% of the 10-minute intervals have fewer than 250 messages (trade and quote). This
screening reduces the number of stocks in the sample to 28. As the results are very similar to those
discussed in Section 4.5 and presented in Tables 4.4 - 4.8, we do not report them, but they are
available upon request.
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to compute price discovery measures and construct liquidity measures8 and use the
data sampled at a millisecond frequency to construct the AT proxy. We omit the
rst and last ve minutes of the trading day to avoid capturing any e¤ects from the
open and close of the market. For the U.S. market, we use the national best bid
and o¤er (NBBO) quotes and for the Canadian market, we use quotes posted at
the TSX. Following Grammig et al. (2005), we use midpoints of quotes as these are
less a¤ected by bid-ask bounce that is normally observed in transaction prices. We
also obtain the intraday Canadian - U.S. Dollar exchange rate quotes from TRTH
and use the midpoint to convert prices into U.S. dollar. This is to facilitate the
specication of the error-term and ensure the comparability of prices between the
two markets, similar to Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and Chen and Choi (2012).
4.3.1 Liquidity Measures and Algorithmic Trading Proxy
As measures of liquidity, we use the trading volume and the e¤ective spread. To make
inferences about the relations between price discovery and measures of liquidity from
both markets, we employ the trading volume and e¤ective spread of the U.S. market
relative to the Canadian market (see also, Eun and Sabherwal, 2003). Relative
trading volume represents the stocks trading activity and is dened as:
Ratio_V olj =
V olUSj
V olUSj + V ol
CAN
j
; (4.1)
where V olUSj and V ol
CAN
j are the average U.S. and Canadian trading volume on day
j, respectively. The second liquidity measure is the relative e¤ective spread, which
measures trading costs. E¤ective spreads are more meaningful for the NYSE than
quoted spreads because specialists and oor brokers are sometimes willing to trade
8Hasbrouck (1995, 2003) indicates that more powerful tests of market e¢ ciency can be carried
out by sampling at very high frequencies to reduce the contemporaneous correlation in the reduced
form residuals between markets that is created by time aggregation. Hasbrouck (2003) uses a
sampling frequency of 1 second, which produces a low contemporaneous residual correlation and
a narrow range of information shares. Similarly, Hendershott and Jones (2005) also sample at 1
second and nd low residual correlations in their price discovery study.
59
Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Price Discovery
at prices within the quoted bid and ask prices. The e¤ective spread is measured as:
Espreadj =
1
x
PT
t=1 2Dt(pt  mt)=mt; (4.2)
where Dt is a trade indicator variable at time t. We assign +1 for buyer-initiated
trades and -1 for seller-initiated trades. We follow the standard trade signing ap-
proach of Lee and Ready (1991) and use contemporaneous quotes to sign trades,
following Bessembinder (2003). pt and mt are the trade price and quote midpoint
prevailing at time t, respectively. When aggregating over a trading day j, we aver-
age the e¤ective spreads over x trades. Subsequently, the relative e¤ective spread is
computed as:
Ratio_Espreadj =
EspreadUSj
EspreadUSj + Espread
CAN
j
: (4.3)
As a proxy for AT, we follow Hendershott et al. (2011) and calculate the negative
trading volume in USD100 divided by the raw message tra¢ c number,
AT ij =
 (Dollar_V olij)=100
Total_messagesij
; (4.4)
where AT ij is the AT activity for market i on day j, Dollar_V ol is the total dollar
trading volume, and Total_messages is the total number of observations in the
order book, which includes all trade executions, order submissions and order cancel-
lations. This ratio represents the negative dollar volume associated with each trade
or quote update. An increase in this measure reects an increase in algorithmic
trading activity.9 Hendershott et al. (2011) explain that there may be an increase
in trading volume over the same interval, and without normalization, a raw message
9Since we do not have data sets that identify actual high-frequency activity, we rely on proxies
for identifying AT. Our AT proxy is used in studies such as Hendershott et al. (2011), and Boehmer
et al. (2014). As an alternative AT proxy, we also use quote-to-trade ratio (see Hagstromer and
Norden, 2013; Skjeltorp et al., 2014). This proxy also reects AT activity as strategies used by
algorithmic traders have contributed to a huge increase in the amount of order tra¢ c relative to
trade executions. Nevertheless, we nd similar ndings.
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tra¢ c measure may just capture the increase in trading rather than the change in
the nature of trading. However, it is important to note that since this AT proxy
draws inferences from total message tra¢ cs, it makes little distinction between HFT
and slower traders with automated trading systems. Since AT is negative, relative
AT activity is measured as
Ratio_ATj =
ATCANj
ATUSj + AT
CAN
j
: (4.5)
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the liquidity measures and AT proxy for the 38
cross-listed stocks in our sample. We report the symbols for the stocks as listed on
the U.S. market. The next few columns report the average trading volume, e¤ective
spread, number of messages, and AT activity in both markets, as well as their values
in the U.S. relative to Canada.
On average, daily trading volume is higher in the U.S. with 1,463,000 shares traded
compared with 1,368,000 shares in Canada. This results in a relative trading volume
of 52% for the U.S. market, suggesting that trading activity is slightly higher in the
U.S. relative to Canada. In terms of e¤ective spread, the U.S. market has a lower
spread, with 8.5 bps compared with 10.5 bps in Canada. Relative e¤ective spread
for the U.S. market is 45%, indicating that, on average, trading costs in the U.S.
are lower than in Canada. The number of messages per 10-minute period is similar
in both markets. In the U.S., there are 1,159 messages every 10 minutes and 1,107
messages in Canada, leading to a ratio of 51% for the U.S. market. Algorithmic
trading activity, on average, is higher (less negative) in the U.S. compared with
Canada with a value of -10.7 and -17.5, respectively. This leads to an AT ratio of
62% for the U.S. relative to Canada.
Figure 4.1 plots the 20-day moving average of trading volume, e¤ective spread, and
AT activity of the U.S., Canada and their relative values. Panel A shows that
relative trading volume, Ratio_V ol, has an upward trend. The increase is notable
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Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Price Discovery
from 2004 to 2008 prior to the Global Financial Crisis when U.S. trading volume
peaked. The trend steadied between 2009 and 2010, but declined in early 2011.
Panel B plots the relative e¤ective spread, Ratio_Espread over the years. Through-
out the entire sample period, the relative e¤ective spread is lower than 0.50, sug-
gesting that trading costs in the U.S. are lower than in Canada during our sample
period. Between 2005 to early 2008, the relative spread was declining due to lower
costs of trading in Canada. The spreads in both markets spiked in the middle of
2008 due to the nancial crisis. From 2009 onwards, the relative spread increased
due to further lowering of trading costs in Canada.
Panel C plots AT activity of the U.S. relative to Canada. The plot for the Ratio_AT
shows that the trend has been downward sloping over the years. This can be at-
tributed to the Canadian market increasing their algorithmic trading activity over
the recent years, especially after the emergence of alternative trading systems in mid-
2007 to compete with the TSX (Clark, 2011). Where the U.S. used to report higher
AT activity than Canada (ratio of greater than 0.5) before 2008, it has declined to
the point that AT activity in Canada is higher than in the U.S. from 2009 onwards.
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Figure 4.1: Liquidity and AT activity of the US relative to Canada
This gure shows time series plots of the U.S. relative daily trading volume, U.S. relative daily
e¤ective spread, and U.S. AT activity. The gures are the 20-day moving averages computed from
the mean Ratio_V ol, Ratio_Espread, and Ratio_AT for the 38 rms in the sample, respectively.
The x-axis represent the sample period from January 2004 to January 2011, while the y-axis
represents the value of the levels for each respective variable.
Panel A: Trading Volume
Panel B: E¤ective Spread
Panel C: Algorithmic Trading Activity
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4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Measuring Price Discovery
The study of price discovery relies on the assumption that when a security is cross-
listed in multiple markets, prices in these markets share a common trend, i.e., prices
are cointegrated. Cointegration implies that prices can deviate from each other
in the short-run due to frictions, but are bound together in the long-run. In our
dual-market case, such a relationship can be presented by two I(1) price series,
yUSt and y
CAN
t being cointegrated with a cointegrating vector, 
0 = ( 1  1 ). The
Engle-Granger Representation Theorem suggests that a cointegrated system can
be expressed as an error-correction model. Hence, the stationary process, 0yt =
yUSt   yCANt , can be applied as an error-correction term for the following VECM,
yt = c+ 
0yt 1 +
NX
n=1
 nyt 1 + t: (4.6)
where yt is the (2  1) vector of log returns, c is a vector of constants,  is a
(2  1) vector that measures the speed of adjustment to the error-correction term
(i.e.  =
0B@ US
CAN
1CA),  n are (2 2) matrices of AR coe¢ cients, and t is a (2 1)
vector of innovations. The VECM has two parts: the rst part, 0yt 1 represents
the long-run equilibrium between the price series. The second part,
NP
n=1
 nyt 1
represents the short-term dynamics induced by market imperfections.
We use the above VECM to compute the price discovery measures between two mar-
kets. Our price discovery measures are the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) permanent
transitory (PT) decomposition, and the Hasbrouck (1995) information share (IS).
Both are directly related and both measures are derived from the VECM.
The PT measure is concerned with permanent shocks that result in a disequilibrium
65
Chapter 4. The Dynamics of Price Discovery
as markets process news at di¤erent speeds. It measures each markets contribution
to the common factor, where the contribution is dened to be a function of the speed
of adjustment coe¢ cients, . Hence, the PT can be computed using the following
equation,
PTUS =
CAN
(CAN + jUSj) ; (4.7)
where US is negative, and CAN is positive given our denition of 0 = ( 1  1 ).
This ratio provides an indication of the degree of dominance of one market over the
other market. A higher value of this ratio reects a greater feedback or contribution
from the US. Therefore, a PTUS of zero would imply that the NYSE does not
contribute to the price discovery of the stocks, whereas a PTUS greater than zero
would imply feedback from the NYSE to the TSX. PTCAN can be computed as
1  PTUS.
The IS measures the proportion of variance contributed by one market with respect
to the variance of the innovations in the common e¢ cient price. To assess this, note
that we can rewrite Equation (4.6) as a vector moving average (Wold representation):
yt = 	(L)et; (4.8)
where	(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator (	(L) = 1+ 1L+ 2L
2+   ).
Following the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition, which states that every
(matrix) polynomial has permanent and transitory structure, we can write Equation
(4.8) in its integrated form as:
yt = 	(1)
Pt
s=1 es +	
(L)et: (4.9)
where 	(1) is the sum of all moving average coe¢ cients, and measures the long-run
impact of an innovation to the level of prices. Since prices are cointegrated, 0yt is
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a stationary process, which implies that 0	(1) = 0, i.e. the long-run impact is the
same for all prices. If we denote  = (  US  CAN ) as the common row vector in
	(1), Equation (4.9) becomes:
yt =  
Pt
s=1 es +	
(L)et: (4.10)
The increment  et in Equation (4.10) is the component of price change that is per-
manently impounded into the price and is due to new information. Hasbrouck (1995)
decomposes the variance of the common factor innovations, i.e., var( et) =  
 
0.
The information share of a market is dened as the proportion of variance in the
common factor that is attributable to innovations in that market. Since Hasbrouck
(1995) uses the Cholesky factorization of 
 = MM 0 to handle contemporaneous
correlation, where M is a lower triangular matrix, the information share of market
i is dened as:
Si =
([ M ]i)
2
( 
 0)
: (4.11)
The Cholesky decomposition of 
 orthogonalizes the innovation terms and assigns
all common variance to one market. To account for multiple markets, Hasbrouck
(1995) suggests that di¤erent orderings of the innovation terms be used so that upper
and lower information share bounds can be computed. Specically, we reverse the
order of the 	(1) as well as M and recompute Equation (4.11). The midpoint of
these bounds is the IS value.
4.4.2 Modelling Price Discovery Dynamics
Section 4.2 indicates that factors such as trading volume, bid-ask spread, and algo-
rithmic trading activity may be related to price discovery. If such relations exist,
the ratio of those variables in one market relative to another, may determine the
dynamics of price discovery between the two markets. To examine such dynamics,
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we use a VAR to model the interactions between price discovery measures, trading
volume, bid-ask spread, and AT activity. We estimate both a reduced-form of the
VAR and a structural VAR that uses the identication through heteroskedasticiy
approach developed by Rigobon (2003). Doing so, we are able to assess lagged and
contemporaneous interactions among the VAR variables.
In this section, we start by describing the framework to estimate a structural VAR.
Given that price discovery measures, trading volume, bid-ask spread, and AT activ-
ity may have contemporaneous e¤ects on each other, and assuming these variables
exhibit persistence, the dynamics of price discovery can be expressed in the following
structural VAR:
AYt = c+
KX
k=1
kYt k + "t: (4.12)
We model in rst di¤erences to eliminate unit roots that each variable may exhibit.
As such, we dene Yt as a (4  1) vector of changes in variables, i.e. Yt =
(ISt; Ratio_V olt; Ratio_Espreadt; Ratio_ATt)0, k is a (4 4) matrix of
coe¢ cients for the autoregressive terms with lag k, and "t is a vector of error terms.
We are particularly interested in matrix A, which is a (4 4) matrix capturing the
structural parameters. Matrix A is normalized such that all diagonal elements are
equal to 1, and its o¤-diagonal elements capture the contemporaneous interactions
between the variables, i.e.,
A =
0BBBBBBB@
1 a12 a13 a14
a21 1 a23 a24
a31 a32 1 a34
a41 a42 a43 1
1CCCCCCCA
:
The o¤-diagonal elements indicate the interactions among the variables. For in-
stance, a12; a13; a14 represent the contemporaneous impact ofRatio_V ol,Ratio_Espread
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and Ratio_AT on IS, while a21; a31; a41 represent the contemporaneous impact
of IS on Ratio_V ol; Ratio_Espread and Ratio_AT . Since the degree of
contemporaneous relations among the VAR variables are not equal, matrix A is not
symmetrical. Consequently, the parameters in matrix A cannot be obtained using
OLS. To overcome this issue, we estimate Equation (4.12) using the identication
through heteroskedasticity methodology. This approach starts with transforming
Equation (4.12) into its reduced-form below:
Yt = A
 1c+ A 1
KX
k=1
k Yt k + A 1"t
Yt = ~c+
KX
k=1
~k Yt k + ~"t; (4.13)
where the residuals ~"t from the reduced-form VAR are related to the residuals "t
from the structural VAR through matrix A. Here, matrix ~k allows us to test for
Granger causality among the VAR variables. At the same time, Equation (4.13)
serves as the basis for the heteroskedasticity identication scheme, because it can be
estimated by OLS. Hence, we can obtain ~"t and use it to identify di¤erent variance
regimes. To do so, we split ~"t into di¤erent subsamples, such that the covariance
matrices under these subsamples are not proportional to each other.10 Once di¤erent
heteroskedastic regimes have been identied, we can increase the number of available
moment conditions and use them to estimate matrix A. The variance of the residuals
of the structural equations will di¤er across all the di¤erent regimes, but matrix A
needs to be the same across these regimes.
In our empirical setting, we obtain the parameters in matrix A through the following
procedures. First, we estimate the reduced-form of Equation (4.13) using OLS. The
lag specication is determined by the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC), which
10Rigobon (2003) suggests that at least two distinct variance regimes for the error terms are
required in order for the identication scheme to work.
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in our case suggests a lag-length of 5 days to remove any serial correlation. From this
step, we obtain the reduced-form residuals, which contain only the contemporaneous
e¤ects.
Second, from the reduced-form residuals, we dene the heteroskedastic regimes. We
do so by computing rolling window variances of 20 observations each, following
Ehrmann et al. (2011). A regime is identied if one variance of a variable exceeds
the average variance of that variable over the sample period plus one standard
deviation, while at the same time the variances of the other three variables do not
exceed their average variances plus one standard deviation. Using this approach,
we identify 6 regimes in total: 1 regime to represent a tranquil state where all the
four variables do not exhibit elevated conditional volatility; 4 regimes where only
one variable exhibits elevated conditional volatility while the other three are stable;
and 1 regime where at least 2 variables exhibit elevated conditional volatility.
Third, once the regimes are identied, we can estimate the variance-covariance ma-
trices, 
s, of the reduced-form residuals in variance regime s (s = 1; 2; :::; 6). Given
that 
";s are the variance-covariance matrices of the structural VAR that we are
interested in, and assuming the following moment conditions hold,
A
sA
0 = 
";s; (4.14)
the parameters in A and 
";s can then be estimated using GMM by minimizing the
following function:
min g0g with g = A
sA0   
";s: (4.15)
Identication is achieved as long as the covariance matrices constitute a system of
equations that is linearly independent. This is assured by the fact that the average
variance of one of the observed variables is elevated, while the others are relatively
stable.
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4.5 Empirical Findings
In this section, we begin by showing how price discovery measures for Canadian
cross-listed stocks vary over time. We then present the Granger causality results
from the reduced-form VAR and the results from the structural VAR as formal
approaches to assess the dynamics of price discovery. Finally, we examine whether
the adoption of the Reg NMS a¤ected the dynamics of price discovery between the
U.S. and Canadian markets.
4.5.1 Price Discovery Over Time
To obtain price discovery estimates over time, the IS and PT are estimated daily
for each rm.11 The daily estimation eliminates the overnight price jumps which
typically generate excessive noise. Throughout this chapter, our price discovery
estimates are based on the U.S. portion of IS and PT. The VECM of Equation (4.6)
is estimated by applying OLS with optimal lag length suggested by the Schwartz
Information Criterion.
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the PT and IS. Panel A reports the
statistics for the levels. During the entire sample, the average (median) IS for the
U.S. market is 52.2% (55.4%), while for PT, it is 59.0% (60.8%). These gures
indicate that the U.S. contribution to price discovery tends to be higher than the
Canadian contribution. We observe a wide range in price discovery measures, from
18.5% to 80.8%, and from 29.0% to 84.7% at the 5th and 95th percentile for IS and
PT, respectively. Both measures are negatively skewed, but do not display excess
kurtosis. The autocorrelation (AC) for IS and PT are 0.674 and 0.667 for the rst
11Prior to estimating the IS and PT, we conduct the usual procedures of unit root and coin-
tegration tests. First, we perform non-stationarity tests using the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test
using SIC to select optimal lag length. For all stocks, we cannot reject the presence of a unit root.
Subsequently, we conduct Johansens (1988) test for cointegration. In all tests, we reject the null
of no cointegration in favour of the alternative of one cointegrating vector. Since the price series in
our sample satisfy both conditions, we conclude that each pair of our sample stocks is cointegrated.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the price discovery measures
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the price discovery measures. IS and PT are
estimated daily from January 2004 to January 2011. The gures reported are the averages for all
38 Canadian cross-listed stocks in the sample. Panel A reports statistics for the levels, and Panel B
reports statistics for the rst di¤erences. ADF is the t-statistics for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test. *** denotes signicance at the 1% level.
IS PT
Panel A: Summary Statistics for levels
Mean 0.522 0.590
5th 0.185 0.290
Median 0.554 0.608
95th 0.808 0.847
Std. Dev. 0.208 0.179
Skewness -0.345 -0.347
Kurtosis 2.525 2.732
AC 0.672 0.667
ADF -2.147 -2.169
Panel B: Summary Statistics for 1st di¤erence
Mean 0.00004 0.00008
5th -0.21854 -0.19921
Median 0.00043 0.00002
95th 0.21655 0.19747
Std. Dev. 0.137 0.125
Skewness 0.008 -0.014
Kurtosis 5.636 5.326
AC -0.450 -0.448
ADF -13.619*** -13.422***
lags, and decrease with increasing lags, hence indicating autoregressive processes.
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test statistics are insignicant, suggesting that
unit roots are present in the IS and PT series.
Panel B reports summary statistics for the rst di¤erences. The mean values of
the rst di¤erences are close to zero, although there is quite some variation on
a daily basis as can be seen from the range of the 5th and 95th percentile and
the standard deviation. The series have skewness values close to zero with excess
kurtosis, suggesting that observations occur predominantly around the mean. We
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do not observe the rst di¤erences to be serially correlated as the AC quickly drops
to zero after one lag. Furthermore, the ADF test statistics are highly signicant.
Thus, we conrm that the rst di¤erence series for IS and PT are stationary.
In Figure 4.2, we plot IS and PT from January 2004 to January 2011, based on
20-day moving average for the 38 stocks in our sample. The IS and PT track each
other closely with the PT being consistently higher than the IS. According to both
measures, price discovery for the U.S. is lower than 50% prior to 2007. This is
consistent with earlier studies which show that the home market for the Canadian-
U.S. cross-listed stocks dominate in terms of price discovery.12 We observe that the
sharp increase in price discovery is around the year 2007. From 2007 onwards, the
U.S. market seems to gain dominance with IS and PT greater than 50%. The IS
and PT reach around 80% in 2010. One possible explanation for the increase in the
U.S.s contribution to price discovery is the implementation of the Reg NMS which
started in 2006 and was nalised in October 2007, an explanation we examine in
Section 4.5.4.
Apart from the slight decrease in IS and PT in late 2008, the increasing trend in
price discovery measures does not seem to be substantially a¤ected by the Global
Financial Crisis. Overall, Figure 4.2 illustrates that price discovery as measured
by IS and PT exhibits persistence over time. Once price discovery is gained by
a particular market, it tends to stay. The next section analyzes what drives this
dynamics in price discovery.
12See for example, Eun and Sabherwal (2003) Chen and Choi (2012).
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Figure 4.2: Price discovery measures (US relative)
This gure shows time series plots of the IS and PT over the sample period January 2004 to
January 2011. The gures are the 20-day moving averages computed from the mean IS and PT
for the 38 rms in the sample.
4.5.2 Reduced-Form VAR Results
In this section, we investigate what drives changes in price discovery over time, i.e.
how measures of price discovery, liquidity, and AT activity interact with each other.
To gain preliminary insight about the relation between these measures, we test for
correlation among them. Table 4.3 presents the correlation matrix among the VAR
variables. Correlation between IS and PT is 0.906, which supports a strong
linkage between the two price discovery measures. We observe that Ratio_V ol is
positively correlated with IS and PT , which is consistent with the literature.
Both Ratio_Espread and Ratio_AT are negatively correlated with IS and
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Table 4.3: Correlation matrix between VAR variables
This table presents the correlation matrix for the series IS, PT , Ratio_V ol,
Ratio_Espread, and Ratio_AT . IS and PT are the rst di¤erences in the price dis-
covery measures IS and PT , respectively. Ratio_V ol is the rst di¤erence in the U.S. trading
volume relative to Canada. Ratio_Espread is the rst di¤erence in the U.S. e¤ective spread
relative to Canada. Ratio_AT is the rst di¤erence of the U.S. AT activity relative to Canada.
IS PT Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_AT
IS 1
PT 0.906 1
Ratio_V ol 0.175 0.130 1
Ratio_Espread -0.121 -0.138 -0.103 1
Ratio_AT -0.221 -0.183 -0.702 0.212 1
PT . Furthermore, Ratio_AT is also negatively correlated with Ratio_V ol
and positively correlated with Ratio_Espread.
To assess the strength and statistical signicance of these relations, we start by
estimating the reduced-form VAR of Equation (4.13) for 38 rms. The sums of the
5-day lagged coe¢ cients are collected and reported in Table 4.4, and the p-values
from the Granger causality tests are reported in parentheses.
Panel A and B of Table 4.4 report the results of the VAR for the IS and PT,
respectively. The second column in each panel presents the factors which a¤ect the
changes in price discovery measures. We observe that IS (PT ) is positively
related to the lagged values of Ratio_V ol with a coe¢ cient of 0.166 (0.140). A
positive change in relative trading volume between the U.S. and Canada over the
previous ve days leads to a positive change in IS (PT) in the following day. This is
in line with the argument of Stickel and Verrechia (1994) that high volume indicates
that the demand underlying a price change is informative, and therefore should be
incorporated into prices.
We also observe that IS (PT ) is negatively related to the lagged values of
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Table 4.4: VAR estimation results
This table presents the sum of the lag coe¢ cients of the VAR in Equation (13). The column
variable is the dependent variable while the row variable is the explanatory variable. Panel A
reports the coe¢ cients from the IS VAR model. Panel B reports the coe¢ cients from the PT VAR
model. Figures in parentheses are the p-values from the Granger Causality Test. *, **, and ***
denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: IS reduced-form VAR model
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_ATP
ISt k -2.155*** 0.028*** -0.001** -0.025*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.017] [0.078]P
Ratio_V olt k 0.166*** -1.876*** -0.015 -0.089***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.214] [0.000]P
Ratio_Espreadt k -0.144** -0.053*** -2.033*** 0.029**
[0.024] [0.006] [0.000] [0.020]P
Ratio_ATt k -0.057** -0.074*** -0.006 -1.830***
[0.025] [0.000] [0.436] [0.000]
Adj. R-squared 0.36 0.30 0.34 0.28
Panel B: PT reduced-form VAR model
Dependent Variable
PT Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_ATP
PTt k -2.091*** 0.051*** -0.0003* -0.049***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.090] [0.000]P
Ratio_V olt k 0.140*** -1.885*** -0.014 -0.093***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.250] [0.000]P
Ratio_Espreadt k -0.172*** -0.034** -2.036*** 0.030**
[0.006] [0.012] [0.000] [0.018]P
Ratio_ATt k -0.007*** -0.079*** -0.002 -1.842***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.305] [0.000]
Adj. R-squared 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.28
Ratio_Espread with a coe¢ cient of -0.144 (-0.172). A decrease in relative e¤ective
spread over the past ve days leads to a positive change in IS (PT) on the following
day. This indicates that as trading costs decrease, price discovery tends to increase,
indicating intermarket competition between liquidity providers. This is consistent
with the cross-sectional ndings of Eun and Sabherwal (2003) who suggest that
a lower spread in one market represents a competitive threat faced by liquidity
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providers in another market. In this case, Canadian liquidity providers become
more responsive to U.S. prices.
The impact of Ratio_AT on IS (PT ) is negative and signicant with a coef-
cient of -0.057 (-0.007). This implies an increase of AT activity in the U.S. relative
to Canada leads to a lower contribution of the U.S. market to price discovery. We
interpret this nding as higher algorithmic trading activity in a market causing a
crowding out e¤ect as arbitrageurs use high-frequency trading algorithms to trade
aggressively and compete with each other for arbitrage opportunity that exists in
the market. This leads to less trading by informed investors who are disadvantaged
in terms of speed. Furthermore, Abergel et al. (2012) explain that high-frequency
traders often use their speed advantage to free-ride on trade-related information
(e.g. order ow, prices, volume, duration between trades) acquired by informed
investors. This may reduce investorsincentives to acquire information in the rst
place, leading to lower price discovery.
The third column in each panel reports the factors which a¤ect the changes in rela-
tive trading volume. We observe that lagged values of IS (PT ) have an impact
onRatio_V ol with a coe¢ cient of 0.028 (0.051). This suggests that improvements
in price discovery lead to an increase in relative trading volume. The coe¢ cients
of Ratio_Espread on Ratio_V ol are negative and signicant at -0.053 (-0.034)
which suggest that as trading becomes cheaper (relative e¤ective spread decreases),
trading volume increases. Furthermore, we nd negative coe¢ cients of Ratio_AT
on Ratio_V ol at -0.074 (-0.079). As relative AT activity increases, relative trad-
ing volume decreases. This nding again indicates that algorithmic traders push
away other traders in the market who are disadvantaged in terms of speed.
The fourth column shows that there is a spillover from lagged values of IS (PT )
to Ratio_Espread with a magnitude of -0.001 (-0.0003). The Granger causality
tests show statistically signicant results, suggesting that trading costs reduce as a
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markets contribution to price discovery increases.
The fth column shows the factors a¤ecting changes in relative AT activity. We
observe that the impact of IS (PT ) on Ratio_AT is negative and signicant
with a coe¢ cient of -0.025 (-0.049). This suggests that algorithmic trading activities
increase as a marketscontribution to price discovery decreases. We conjecture the
increase in AT is due to an increase in high-frequency trading through latency arbi-
trage strategies. Arbitrageurs trade more actively as markets become less e¢ cient
in processing and incorporating information into their prices. This nding is in line
with Kozhan and Tham (2012), Gai et al. (2014), and Egginton et al. (2014). The
negative coe¢ cients of Ratio_V ol and positive coe¢ cients of Ratio_Espread
onIS (PT ), respectively, further suggest that ine¢ ciencies in the market attract
algorithmic traders who use speed to benet from these ine¢ ciencies.
Overall, these results suggest that relative increases in liquidity (i.e. higher relative
trading volume and lower e¤ective spread) lead to a greater contribution of a market
to price discovery. Conversely, an improvement in price discovery leads to greater
liquidity. Moreover, an increase in algorithmic trading activity of a market relative
to another market leads to lower price discovery, while the inverse is also true.
4.5.3 Structural VAR Results
In addition to lagged e¤ects, we also assess the contemporaneous causal relations be-
tween variables using the identication through heteroskedasticity approach (Rigobon,
2003). The structural VAR of Equation (4.12) is estimated using GMM for each of
the 38 rms separately. The coe¢ cients are then averaged while the standard errors
are computed cross-sectionally.
Panel A and B of Table 4.5 report the results for the contemporaneous relation
between the variables in the structural VAR model. The second column reports
the impact of liquidity and AT activity on price discovery. We observe a signicant
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Table 4.5: Contemporaneous relation between variables
This table presents the coe¢ cients for the contemporaneous interactions between the VAR vari-
ables. Note that the coe¢ cients in this table have the opposite signs to the coe¢ cients of matrix A
because matrix A is on the left-hand side of Equation (12). When taken to the right-hand side the
e¤ects become positive. Subsequently, the column variable is the dependent variable while the row
variable is the explanatory variable. Panel A reports the results from the IS VAR model. Panel B
reports the results from the PT VAR model. Figures in parentheses are the p-values. *, **, and
*** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: IS structural VAR model
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_AT
ISt 1 0.011 -0.008 -0.043***
[0.185] [0.112] [0.000]
Ratio_V olt 0.080*** 1 0.005 -0.352***
[0.003] [0.610] [0.000]
Ratio_Espreadt -0.337*** -0.073* 1 0.269***
[0.000] [0.086] [0.000]
Ratio_ATt -0.084** -0.489*** 0.033** 1
[0.012] [0.000] [0.022]
Panel B: PT structural VAR model
Dependent Variable
PT Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_AT
PTt 1 0.006 -0.018** -0.021*
[0.440] [0.011] [0.063]
Ratio_V olt 0.014 1 0.015 -0.335***
[0.487] [0.115] [0.000]
Ratio_Espreadt -0.241*** -0.041 1 0.391***
[0.001] [0.288] [0.000]
Ratio_ATt -0.153*** -0.515*** 0.030** 1
[0.000] [0.000] [0.024]
and positive causal e¤ect of Ratio_V ol on IS with a coe¢ cient of 0.080. There
is a strong negative contemporaneous e¤ect of Ratio_Espread on IS (PT )
with a coe¢ cient of -0.337 (-0.241). The last row of each Panel indicates a negative
contemporaneous interaction of Ratio_AT on IS (PT ) at -0.084 (-0.153).
The fact that these relations are observed in both structural and reduced-form VAR
models suggests that liquidity and AT activity a¤ect price discovery instantaneously
as well as with some lags.
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The third column reports the coe¢ cients for the determinants of Ratio_V ol. We
observe a signicant negative relation between Ratio_Espread and Ratio_V ol,
and between Ratio_AT and Ratio_V ol. However, we do not observe a signif-
icant contemporaneous causal e¤ect of IS (PT ) on Ratio_V ol. This nding
suggests that price discovery tends to a¤ect trading volume with lags. Furthermore,
the contemporaneous impact of Ratio_AT onRatio_V ol is highly signicant at
-0.489 (-0.515), indicating that the impact of AT on relative trading volume is more
prevalent contemporaneously, i.e. as algorithmic traders enter the market, trading
activity by non-AT traders decreases.
In the fourth column, we observe that PT negatively a¤ects Ratio_Espread
with a coe¢ cient of -0.018, suggesting that an increase in PT leads to a decrease in
relative spread. We also observe thatRatio_AT signicantly a¤ectsRatio_Espread,
which we did not observe in Table 4.4. We interpret this as AT pushes away other
traders in the market who are relatively disadvantaged in terms of speed, hence
causing spread to increase.
Finally, in the last column, we observe similar signicant relations as previously
observed in Table 4.4. However, the coe¢ cients of Ratio_V ol on Ratio_AT
and ofRatio_Espread onRatio_AT are greater in magnitude at -0.352 (-0.335)
and 0.269 (0.391) for the IS (PT) model, respectively. These results suggest that
AT activity reacts strongly to changes in liquidity within the same day. Specically,
when the spread is wide and there are only few traders in the market, algorithmic
traders enter the market and react to these ine¢ ciencies very quickly.
Overall, Table 4.5 shows that there exists not only lagged, but also contemporaneous
relations between relative liquidity, AT activity, and price discovery. Furthermore,
our ndings emphasize the importance of speed by algorithmic traders, and how
other traders in the market react to them.
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4.5.4 Price Discovery Dynamics Pre- and Post-Regulation
NMS
As a further test, we assess the impact of regulatory changes in the U.S. market. Reg
NMS was prompted by the Securities and Exchange Commissions belief that market
fragmentation reduces liquidity and that the new regulation would help create a
more integrated market.13 Hendershott and Jones (2005) suggest that an increase
in market fragmentation leads to slower price discovery. Hence, regulatory changes
to create a more integrated market should improve price discovery. Furthermore,
Barclay et al. (2008) nd that the consolidation of orders is important for producing
e¢ cient prices, especially during times of high liquidity demand. On the contrary,
Chung and Chuwonganant (2012) examine the liquidity of the U.S. stock markets
one month before and after the adoption of Reg NMS and nd that liquidity was
reduced in the form of increased quoted and e¤ective spreads, as well as decreased
quoted dollar depth. These evidences indicate that there may be an impact of Reg
NMS on the dynamics of price discovery.
In this section, we rst show how price discovery, liquidity, and AT activity changed
after the Reg NMS. We then examine whether the adoption of the Reg NMS a¤ects
the dynamics of price discovery for cross-listed stocks. We split our data into two
sub-periods based on the completion date of the Reg NMS on 8 October 2007. The
rst sub-period is from 2 January 2004 to 5 October 2007 as the pre-NMS period.
The second sub-period is from 8 October 2007 to 31 January 2011 as the post-NMS
period.
Table 4.6 reports the percentage change in price discovery, liquidity, and AT mea-
sures between pre- and post-NMS periods. We observe that trading volume in the
13The regulation was intended to improve fairness in price execution, and to improve the display-
ing of quotes and access to market data. One of the most inuential components of the Reg. NMS
is the Order Protection Rule (OPR) which requires that marketplaces enforce policies to ensure
consistent price quotation and prevent trading through a better priced order on another market.
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Table 4.6: Changes in variables surrounding the Regulation NMS
This table provides the change in price discovery, liquidity, and algorithmic trading activity mea-
sures for 38 Canadian cross-listed stocks. The gures reported are the percentage di¤erences
before and after the adoption of Regulation NMS on 8 October 2007. Figures in parentheses are
the t-statistics. **, and *** denote signicance at the 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Di¤ t-stat
V olUS 279%*** (7.52)
V olCAN 84%*** (4.51)
Ratio_V ol 78%*** (5.00)
EspreadUS -4% (-0.31)
EspreadCAN -10% (-0.89)
Ratio_Espread 3%** (2.02)
ATUS 40%*** (7.21)
ATCAN 69%*** (33.53)
Ratio_AT -19%*** (-8.68)
IS 97%*** (8.50)
PT 53%*** (10.75)
U.S. increased signicantly by 279% compared with Canada where it only increased
by 53%. This indicates a much larger increase in liquidity in the U.S. compared to
Canada after Reg NMS. Consequently, relative trading volume increased by 78%.
E¤ective spreads, on the other hand, did not change signicantly in either mar-
kets. Contrary to Chung and Chuwonganant (2012), we do not observe a decline
in spreads after the adoption of Reg NMS, but rather an improvement in trading
volume. As for AT activity, the U.S. market experienced a signicant increase by
40%. In Canada, the increase in AT activity is more substantial at 69%. These
ndings are in line with Panel C of Figure 1, which shows that the increase in AT
activity is much higher in Canada than in the U.S.
We nd that both IS and PT increased signicantly by 97% and 53%, respectively,
suggesting that the U.S. contribution to price discovery has increased signicantly
after the Reg NMS. These ndings are in line with Hendershott and Jones (2005)
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and Barclay et al. (2008) who advocate that a new regulation to create a more
integrated market would lead to greater price discovery. Based on the statistics in
Table 4.6, it is evident that price discovery has increased signicantly after the Reg
NMS.
We test the impact of Reg NMS on price discovery dynamics by examining the
relations between liquidity, AT activity and price discovery measures during the two
sub-periods. Table 4.7 shows the result of the VAR analysis of Equation (4.13) for
the two sub-periods. For brevity, we only report the results from IS VAR model.14
Overall, we do not observe any signicant di¤erences from those reported in Table
4.5. As shown in Panel A and B of Table 4.7, changes in relative trading volume
positively a¤ect the changes in IS as shown by the highly signicant p-values from the
Granger causality tests. We also observe that changes in relative e¤ective spread
and relative AT activity are negatively related to changes in IS. In the opposite
direction, we observe that changes in IS lead to positive changes in relative trading
volume as shown by the rst row of the third column in each Panel. The impact on
changes in relative e¤ective spread remains small and signicant for the rst sub-
period, but insignicant for the second sub-period. The negative coe¢ cients for the
changes in relative AT activity are also negative, despite being signicant only for
the second sub-period. Based on these observations, we conclude that the drivers of
price discovery have not changed signicantly after the adoption of the Reg NMS.
Table 4.8 shows the contemporaneous relations of the VAR variables in Equation
(4.12) during the two sub-periods. Similar to the results in Table 4.6, we observe
uni-directional relation between liquidity and price discovery measure. Speci-
cally, changes in relative trading volume contemporaneously and positively a¤ect
the changes in IS, while changes in relative e¤ective spread contemporaneously and
negatively a¤ect the changes in IS. The bi-directional negative relation between AT
14The PT VAR model yields similar results and are available upon request.
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Table 4.7: Sub-periods VAR estimation results
This table presents the sum of the lag coe¢ cients of the IS VAR in Equation (13) at two sub-periods
surrounding Reg NMS: before and after 8 October 2007. The column variable is the dependent
variable while the row variable is the explanatory variable. Panel A reports the coe¢ cients from the
IS VAR model with the pre-NMS sample. Panel B reports the coe¢ cients from the IS VAR model
with the post-NMS sample. Figures in parentheses are the p-values from the Granger Causality
Test. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: IS reduced-form VAR model (pre Reg NMS)
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_ATP
ISt k -2.202*** 0.012** -0.003** -0.024
[0.000] [0.018] [0.041] [0.409]P
Ratio_V olt k 0.160*** -1.881*** -0.024 -0.107***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.342] [0.000]P
Ratio_Espreadt k -0.095* -0.091** -2.096*** 0.002**
[0.071] [0.018] [0.000] [0.021]P
Ratio_ATt k -0.088** -0.100*** 0.007 -1.902***
[0.035] [0.000] [0.819] [0.000]
Adj. R-squared 0.37 0.31 0.34 0.29
Panel B: IS reduced-form VAR model (post Reg NMS)
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_ATP
ISt k -2.025*** 0.069*** 0.0035 -0.039***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.276] [0.003]P
Ratio_V olt k 0.157*** -1.886*** 0.006 -0.076**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.982] [0.037]P
Ratio_Espreadt k -0.237*** -0.329*** -1.913*** 0.143
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.145]P
Ratio_ATt k -0.026*** -0.065*** -0.010* -1.750***
[0.005] [0.000] [0.092] [0.000]
Adj. R-squared 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.27
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activity and price discovery measures still persists. Overall, the results presented in
Table 4.8 are similar to those reported in Table 4.6.
Both Table 4.7 and 4.8 show that the relations between price discovery and liquidity
and AT measures persist even after taking into account the regulatory changes in
the U.S. nancial markets. We still observe a positive relation of relative trading
volume on price discovery, as well as negative relation of relative e¤ective spread
and AT activity on price discovery.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we study price discovery dynamics for a sample of Canadian cross-
listed stocks in the U.S. from January 2004 to January 2011. We compute daily
measures of price discovery and assess the causal relations between price discovery,
liquidity, and algorithmic trading activity. To accommodate both lagged and con-
temporaneous relations among the variables, we follow the approach of Chaboud et
al. (2014) by estimating a reduced-form VAR, as well as a structural VAR using the
identication through heteroskedasticity approach developed by Rigobon (2003).
We show that price discovery of the U.S. market relative to Canada exhibits an up-
ward trend, suggesting that over time, the U.S. market is becoming more dominant
in terms of the price formation process of Canadian cross-listed stocks. Assessing
the dynamics involved, we nd that liquidity is related to price discovery. Improve-
ments in relative liquidity (an increase in trading volume and a decrease in e¤ective
spread in one market relative to another) increase an the markets contribution to
price discovery. This impact is felt instantaneously as well as with a protracted
lag. Conversely, we nd that an increase in price discovery leads to better liquidity.
We also nd that relative algorithmic trading activity is negatively related to price
discovery. This nding is consistent with the literature on negative externalities of
high-frequency trading. Particularly, as arbitrageurs use computer algorithms to
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Table 4.8: Sub-periods contemporaneous relation results
This table presents the coe¢ cients for the contemporaneous interactions between the IS VAR
variables at two sub-periods surrounding Reg NMS: before and after 8 October 2007. Note that
the coe¢ cients in this table have the opposite signs to the coe¢ cients of matrix A because matrix
A is on the left-hand side of Equation (12). When taken to the right-hand side the e¤ects become
positive. Subsequently, the column variable is the dependent variable while the row variable is
the explanatory variable. Panel A reports the results from the IS VAR model with the pre-NMS
sample . Panel B reports the results from the IS VAR model with the post-NMS sample. Figures
in parentheses are the p-values. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: IS structural VAR model (pre Reg NMS)
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_AT
ISt 1 -0.002 -0.006 -0.032**
[0.832] [0.335] [0.016]
Ratio_V olt 0.123* 1 0.067** -0.392***
[0.084] [0.010] [0.000]
Ratio_Espreadt -0.327*** 0.012 1 0.278***
[0.002] [0.772] [0.000]
Ratio_ATt -0.175** -0.590*** 0.155*** 1
[0.016] [0.000] [0.000]
Panel B: IS structural VAR model (post Reg NMS)
Dependent Variable
IS Ratio_V ol Ratio_Espread Ratio_AT
ISt 1 0.023 -0.014* -0.032*
[0.309] [0.078] [0.060]
Ratio_V olt 0.087** 1 -0.015 -0.359***
[0.020] [0.100] [0.000]
Ratio_Espreadt -0.150** -0.054 1 0.230***
[0.037] [0.349] [0.001]
Ratio_ATt -0.057* -0.430*** -0.006 1
[0.090] [0.000] [0.657]
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trade aggressively and compete for latency arbitrage opportunity that exists in the
market, they cause a crowding-out e¤ect. Consequently, high-frequency trading by
these arbitrageurs pushes away informed investors, who are disadvantaged in terms
of speed. We further observe that while the U.S. markets contribution to price dis-
covery increased after the adoption of the Regulation NMS, the dynamics of price
discovery persist.
Overall, our ndings highlight the importance of liquidity for exchanges in order to
improve price discovery, as well as the importance of price discovery to attract more
investors. AT activity by arbitrageurs should be of interest to exchange o¢ cials as
the crowding out e¤ect may push investors away to trade in another market.
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5.1 Introduction
A substantial amount of market microstructure research focuses on the process of
how information is incorporated into security prices. When information enters a
market, investors and liquidity providers update their expectations about the value
of a security, resulting in a price change. Such information can be inferred from
trades (see e.g. Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; and Glosten and Milgrom,
1985), and from quotes (see e.g. Jang and Venkatesh, 1991; Huang and Stoll, 1994).
Trades are informative because of the presence of informed investors who buy when
they have good news, and sell when they have bad news. Quotes are informative
because they reect the information acquired by liquidity providers. For example,
the di¤erence between bid and ask prices (the spread) reects a balancing of losses
to the informed with gains from the uninformed traders. Both trades and quotes
reect information signals from various market participants. The relations between
these information signals and prices have become the basis of many microstructure
theories as discussed in OHara (1995).
Numerous studies have documented how information from quotes and trades a¤ects
stock prices in a single market. How this information a¤ects prices across markets,
however, has not been examined. As such, the understanding of how prices are
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determined and the mechanisms underlying security trades in multiple markets is
limited. Despite the lack of evidence, we can expect that prices of cross-listed stocks
in any given market be determined by information being revealed in any of the
markets where the stock is traded in. Prices in various markets are linked because,
despite the di¤erence in trading venue, these stocks share a common e¢ cient price.
Intermarket arbitrage keeps prices in di¤erent markets from drifting too far apart
and hence prices are cointegrated (see e.g. Lieberman et al., 1999; Baillie et al.,
2002; and Pascual et al., 2006).
In this paper, we aim to improve our understanding of the price formation process
for stocks with foreign listings. We do so by assessing the mechanism of how infor-
mation is incorporated into prices. As shown in Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001),
Engle and Patton (2004), and Escribano and Pascual (2005), there is additional in-
formation gained from analyzing the dynamics of ask and bid prices jointly rather
than averaging them through the quote midpoint. The reason is that information
causes asymmetric revisions of market quotes, i.e. bid and ask prices do not respond
symmetrically to buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Hence, we conjecture that the
dynamics of bid and ask prices will provide insights into the price formation process
in multiple markets. Understanding how bid and ask prices are determined and
the mechanism underlying such a process is crucial for exchanges and regulators
in order to adjust and introduce new trading rules, keeping markets competitive.
This is important, given the growth in foreign listings and the increased intermarket
competition between exchanges in recent years.1
We develop a general model to study quote dynamics of stocks traded in dual mar-
kets. This model builds on the framework of cointegrated quotes which assumes that
quotes of the same stocks in various markets are driven by the same information.
A similar framework was implemented in Engle and Patton (2004) and Escribano
1See for example Pagano et al. (2002), Halling et al. (2008) and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008)
for evidences of cross-listings.
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and Pascual (2006). The model incorporates various variables which according to
market microstructure theories should a¤ect prices. We use the bid-ask spread
(Demsetz, 1968; Jang and Venkatesh, 1991) and depth di¤erence (Huang and Stoll,
1994) to represent quote-related information. We also use the direction of trade
(Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Jang and Venkatesh, 1991), trading volume (Easley
and OHara, 1987; Barclay and Warner, 1993), trade duration (Easley and OHara,
1992) and trade order ow (Kyle, 1985) to represent trade-related information.
Our work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide a tool, which
can be used to study the mechanism of how information a¤ects prices in two di¤erent
markets, and to assess the degree of information spillover between them. Second,
the model allows us to assess the relevance of existing microstructure theories in
explaining price dynamics in a dual-market setting. Third, we demonstrate how our
model can be transformed to an implied vector autoregression (VAR) for the bid-
ask spreads in the two markets, the change in price midpoint and the di¤erence in
midquotes across markets.2 Our implied model allows us to study how information
a¤ects these variables, which are fundamental for cross-listed stocks. For instance,
spreads measure the degree of friction in each of the markets, the midpoint of quotes
of the two markets represents the implied e¢ cient price of the cross-listed stock, and
the cross-market di¤erence in midquotes represents the relative premium of trading
in one market over another.
Applying our model to Canadian stocks which are cross-listed in the U.S., we doc-
ument several important ndings. First, we observe that quote changes in one
market lead to quote changes in another market, indicating that prices in both
markets are linked directly to each other. Second, quote-related information such
as bid-ask spread and the di¤erence in bid and ask depths directly a¤ect prices in
2A similar structure has been proposed by Engle and Patton (2004). In their study, the VECM
model is transformed into an implied VAR for the bid-ask spread and the change in quote midpoint.
Our multi-market quote revision model extends their analysis by constructing the bid-ask spreads
in each of the markets, the change in midpoint of prices of the two markets, and the cross-market
di¤erence in midquotes.
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both markets, indicating some degree of intermarket competition between liquidity
providers. Third, we observe that while prices adjust primarily to trades in their
respective market, they are also a¤ected by trades from the other market. We there-
fore conjecture that there is a small degree of information spillover between the two
markets. Finally, we nd that information plays a greater role in the U.S than in
Canada, leading to a greater impact of U.S. trades on the midpoint returns (implied
e¢ cient price) and on the di¤erence in midquotes (price premium).3
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we review the
literature. In Section 5.3, we present the model for the quote dynamics. In Section
5.4, we describe the data. In Section 5.5, we analyze the empirical results of the
quote model as well as the design and ndings of the implied model. Finally, Section
5.6 concludes.
5.2 Literature Review
Market microstructure studies show that information can be inferred from various
sources, such as quotes and trades. Throughout this chapter, we refer to this infor-
mation as quote- and trade-related information. As such, we start this section with
a discussion on how quote- and trade-related information a¤ects prices. We discuss
studies which assess the role of information on bid and ask prices in a single market.
We then explain why it is important to study the dynamics of quotes in multiple
markets.
Studies have shown that quote-related information such as the bid-ask spread a¤ects
prices. Demsetz (1968) calls the spread the cost of immediacy. Investors who want to
buy immediately need to pay the ask price, while those who want to sell immediately
need to agree with the bid price. As such, the spread represents a prot to liquidity
3This is in line with the ndings in Chapter 3 where we observe price discovery shifts from
Canada to the U.S. during macroeconomic news announcements.
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providers. It is informative because competition between liquidity providers will
determine the change in spread. Jang and Venkatesh (1991) show that the bid-ask
spread a¤ects bid and ask prices through error-correcting behavior - a large spread
at the previous quote leads to a rise in the bid price and a fall in the ask price at
the following quote, to restore the spread to its long-run equilibrium value.
Information can also be inferred from the di¤erence in quoted depth. Depth repre-
sents the extent to which an asset is able to absorb buy and sell orders without the
price dramatically moving in either direction. Huang and Stoll (1994) suggest that
the di¤erence between the depth at the ask and the bid conveys important infor-
mation. High depth at the ask relative to bid indicates an excess number of sellers
relative to buyers, signalling that the stock is overpriced (signalling e¤ect). A higher
depth at the ask relative to bid also means less trade volume is required before a
downward movement than an upward movement, making a downward movement in
prices more likely, leading to lower bid and ask prices (barrier e¤ect).
Market microstructure theory further suggests that stock prices are a¤ected by
trade-related information. The importance of trades was originally explained in
Bagehot (1971). A market comprises both informed and uninformed traders. Trades
by the informed would result in liquidity providers losing on average to these traders.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) explain that the direction of trade is informative be-
cause in a competitive market, informed agentstrades will reect their information,
either selling if they have received bad news or buying if they have received good
news. Jang and Venkatesh (1991) show how a liquidity provider revises his quotes
following a transaction. For instance, following a transaction at the bid price, both
the bid and the ask prices will be revised downward. This is because a trade at the
bid price indicates that some informed traders know that the true value of the asset
is lower. Knowing that, the liquidity provider will subsequently lower his bid and
ask prices.
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Apart from the direction of trade, information can also be gleaned from other trade-
related features. First is trade size. Easley and OHara (1987) explain that trade size
induces an adverse selection problem, because given the same price, the informed
traders always prefers to trade larger quantities to maximize their expected prots.
Since uninformed traders do not share this size bias, a rational liquidity provider
will interpret large orders as a signal that an information event has occurred and
adjust prices accordingly by increasing his bid and ask prices. Barclay and Warner
(1993) and Chakravarty (2001), however, suggest that informed traders may prefer
to trade in a size that is not too large and not too small in order to disguise their
private information (stealth trading). In such a case, medium-sized trade should
provide the strongest signal of private information and stock prices should react
to those trades the most. Another trade-related feature is trade duration. Easley
and OHara (1992) and Dufour and Engle (2000) show that since trades provide
signals of the direction of any new information, the lack of trade provides a signal of
no new information (event uncertainty). Hence the absence of trade could provide
information to market participants. Finally, signed order ow leads to changes in
prices. Kyle (1985) proposes that because liquidity providers cannot distinguish the
individual quantities traded by the insider or liquidity (noise) traders separately,
nor do they have any other kind of special information, they set prices based on the
observations of the current and past aggregate quantities traded by the insider and
noise traders combined, known as the order ow.
The literature above discusses the theories and empirical evidence on how informa-
tion a¤ects quotes in a single-market. As discussed in Escribano and Pascual (2006),
quotes do not respond identically to information, i.e. bid and ask prices do not re-
spond symmetrically to buyer- and seller-initiated trades. Hence, there is additional
information gained from analyzing the dynamics of ask and bid prices jointly rather
than averaging them through the quote midpoint. Consequently, empirical studies
on bid and ask dynamics have improved our understanding of the price formation
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process. For example, Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) model bid and ask prices,
and bid and ask depths simultaneously to examine how NYSE liquidity providers
update their prices and quoted depths. They nd that changes in the best prices and
the depths of the limit order book have a signicant impact on each other. Engle
and Patton (2004) specify an error-correction model for the log di¤erence of the bid
and the ask price with the spread acting as the error-correction term, and include
various trade-related information as regressors. They show that the dynamics of the
bid-ask spread is heavily inuenced by the di¤erential response of bids and asks to
buys and sells; a buy has a greater impact on the ask price than on the bid price,
while a sell has a greater impact on the bid price than on the ask price.
The existing literature to date has only focused on examining quote dynamics in a
single-market context. The question how information a¤ects quotes in multiple mar-
kets has not been examined. Furthermore, the relevance of microstructure theories
in a multiple-market context is still untested. In order to improve the understanding
of price formation process for stocks with foreign listings, we start by analyzing the
dynamics of quotes in dual markets. We propose that bid and ask prices from two
markets be modelled jointly. Such specication allows us to examine how prices in
each market respond to information entering any of the two markets. This model
will be discussed in the next section.
5.3 Dual-Market Quote Dynamics
In this section, we present the model for dual-market quote dynamics. We build
on the framework of cointegrated quotes as applied in Engle and Patton (2004)
and Escribano and Pascual (2006). These studies employ an error-correction model
between bid and ask prices, of which quotes are cointegrated with the bid-ask spread
being the error-correction term. The VECM is widely used to analyze asymmetries
in the short-run impacts of trades on the bid or ask price, and it is more dynamic
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since it controls for serial dependencies of the variables. One appealing feature of
the VECM is that it allows the cointegrating relationship to be known a priori,
and therefore sets a very general parameterization of the model. Furthermore, it is
exible enough to accommodate a multi-market extension.
Empirically, we extend a VECM into a dual-market setting and represent bid and
ask prices from two markets in simultaneous equations. We follow the specication
of Engle and Patton (2004) and model the quote revisions as a function of quote
and trade-related information, which reects the mechanism of how information is
aggregated and disseminated into quotes. We specify the model in terms of log-
di¤erences, of which the log levels of the bid and ask prices in each market are
cointegrated of order one.
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where c is a (41) vector of constants, A(j) are (44) matrices of AR coe¢ cients
at lag j, B is a (42) matrix of spreads coe¢ cients,  1 is a (42) matrix of depth
di¤erence coe¢ cients,  (k)2 and  
(k)
3 are (46) matrices of trade-related variables at
the kth most recent trade at the buy and sell side, respectively,  4 is a (44) matrix
of total trade coe¢ cients,  (d)5 are (41) vectors of diurnalilty (intraday seasonality)
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coe¢ cients at time of the day d, and "t is a (41) vector of innovations.
The model is dened in quote time which means a new observation is recorded each
time there is a change in quotes. The subscript t, denotes the tth observation in the
chronological sequence of quotes, while trades are indexed according to the quote
they precede: (t) k indexes the kth most recent trade to quote observation t. The
function l(t) counts the number of trades occuring between quote t  1 and quote t.
Microstructure data such as the changes in quotes often show evidence of negative
serial correlation (Stoll, 2000). To control for this serial correlation, we employ ten
lags of the dependent variables, and include information on the three most recent
trades as exogenous regressors in our model.
Table 5.1 lists and describes the variables used in this study. We use SPREAD
and DEPTH_DIFF to represent quote-related information potentially a¤ecting
quote revisions. The log spreads are also the error-correction terms because the log
levels of the bid and ask prices are cointegrated. We include BUY and SELL to
represent trades at both sides of the market. We follow the standard trade signing
approach of Lee and Ready (1991) and use contemporaneous quotes to sign trades,
following Bessembinder (2003). If the trade price was higher than the mid-quote,
the trade is considered a buy, while if the trade price is lower than the mid-quote,
the trade is considered a sell. A trade that occurs exactly at the mid-quote is
considered indeterminate and given a value of zero. With regard to trade size, we
include a volume indicator, V med which takes a value one if the trade volume was
between 1,000 and 10,000 shares and zero otherwise. We do not employ an indicator
for big volume trades since they are extremely rare for our sample stocks (refer to
Table 5.2 on the summary statistics). To capture the impact of trading intensity, we
include trade duration variable, D; which is calculated as the di¤erence in seconds
between two consecutive trades. The signed order ow variables
Pl(t)
k=1BUY(t) k
and
Pl(t)
k=1 SELL(t) k count the number of buys or sells between the current and
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the previous quotes, and represent order ow in the market. Finally, to capture
any deterministic component of intra-day dynamics, we follow the commonly used
approach by including time-of-the-day dummies, DIURN into the model.4
5.4 Data
Our sample consists of 64 cross-listed stocks and spans eleven months from February
1, 2011 to December 31, 2011.5 This sample constitutes all Canadian stocks listed
on both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange, which are
readily tradeable in both markets over the sample period, and are available in the
database. We use tick level data from TRTH (Thomson Reuters Tick History) data-
base maintained by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacic (SIRCA).
Specically, we obtain the time stamp (to the nearest microsecond) of bid and ask
prices, bid and ask depths, trade prices, and trade volumes for the stocks in each
market over 225 trading days. For each of these variables, we use data from the
consolidated tape to ensure that our analysis captures the quote dynamics in the
two markets accurately. In addition, we also obtain CAD/USD quotes from TRTH,
and use the midpoint to convert the Canadian quotes and trade prices into U.S.
Dollar to facilitate the specication of the error-term and ensure the comparability
of prices between the two markets.6
Table 5.2 presents the stocks in our sample and the summary statistics of the data
over the sample period. The average number of daily trades ranges from 44 trades
(STN) to 25,616 trades (SLW) with an average of 5,934 trades in the U.S. Average
daily trades in the U.S. are higher than the average daily trades in Canada of 4,284
trades which ranges from 55 trades (NOA) to 14,496 trades (SU). In terms of trading
4For example, see Dufour and Engle (2000), Engle and Patton (2004).
5The starting date is chosen following the Order Protection Rule which was introduced on Feb
1, 2011 in Canada.
6We use the standing exchange rate midpoint prior to any Canadian quotes to convert the
quotes into U.S. dollar.
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Chapter 5. Quote Dynamics of Cross-Listed Stocks
volume, average transaction size is lower in the U.S. than in Canada. The majority
of transactions fall in the small trade category (volume of less than 1,000 shares). A
small portion of trades falls in the medium category, while big trades are extremely
rare. Average daily percentage spread is higher in the U.S., 0.096% compared to
0.091% in Canada, and 41 out of 64 stocks report higher percentage spread in the
U.S. than in Canada. Spread is negatively correlated with trades. For example,
EQU and STN trade at the highest spread in the U.S. Similarly, EQU and NOA
have the highest spread in Canada. These stocks are some of the least frequently
traded stocks in their respective markets. Finally, if we look at trade duration,
STN and CAE in the U.S. and NOA and MIM in Canada are the least frequently
traded stocks and have the highest average trade durations of 770, 443, 725 and 456
seconds, respectively. Apart from these stocks, most transactions occur within 60
seconds of each other with many of them trade within less than 10 seconds.
For our analyses, we rst discard any transactions and quotes that occur outside
trading hours between 9.35AM to 16.00PM.7 Second, high-frequency data contains
a high ratio of number of quotes in a period to the number of trades. Since a
large proportion of these quotes are adjustments to the quote depths at a particular
price, and not changes in actual quote prices, we only keep a new quote observation
whenever one (or both) quotes change. Third, we sometimes observe trades executed
at di¤erent prices but at the same time stamp. In such cases, we treat them as one
trade. We assign the appropriate price of the trade using value weighted average
price and as for the volume, we sum the total volume of the trades. Finally, we
combine the U.S. and Canadian datasets by rst compiling a series of quote time
using the time stamps from both markets. Once the series is constructed, we connect
7We omit the rst ve minutes of the trading day to ensure synchronicity of the data in both
markets, since sometimes trading in one of the markets starts later than 9:30AM. This also allows
us to avoid contamination of prices by overnight news arrival.
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the data from each market according to the time stamps.8 If there is no data for
any one market at a particular time stamp, we assign a value of zero.9
5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Quote Dynamics Model
In this section, we present the results for our quote model. We estimate Equation
(5.1) for each of the 64 stocks daily. This totals to 14,400 separate estimations. The
average R2(adj) statistics for the U.S. bid and ask equations is 0.253 while for the
Canadian bid and ask equations is 0.208. We report the results in the form of the
mean coe¢ cients for each stock throughout the entire sample period, along with
a percentage count of the number of times the coe¢ cient is signicantly positive
and negative at the 5% level. We use Whites (1980) robust standard errors in our
estimations to correct for possible heteroskedasticity.
We observe substantial evidence of increased bid and ask spreads at the beginning
of the trading day in both markets, as can be seen from Table 5.3. From 9.30AM to
10AM especially, the diurnal variables show signicant positive coe¢ cients on the
ask prices and signicant negative coe¢ cients on the bid prices in both markets.
The coe¢ cients of the diurnal variables decrease gradually over the subsequent time
of the day. This implies that the beginning of trading day displays a signicant
deterministic component, consistent with the literature; for example, Hasbrouck
(1999) and Dufour and Engle (2000).
8We acknowledge that there can be di¤erences in how Thomson Reuters record time between
the U.S. and Canada. Therefore, the time stamps from TRTH may di¤er from the actual time
recorded by the exchanges. However, since there is no actual exchange time recorded for quotes,
we do not know which market is rst to record quotes.
9Since our quote model is in rst di¤erences, adding zeros to the series will only mean that
there is no change in quotes at that particular time stamp.
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Table 5.3: Diurnality Coe¢ cients of The Quote Model
This table reports the coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the diurnality variables (coe¢ cients  (d)5
in Equation 5.1). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of times the variable was
signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400 observations.
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
DIURN9:30AM 0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 49/1 1/51 25/2 2/28
DIURN10AM 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 34/2 2/36 17/3 3/18
DIURN11AM 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 26/3 3/26 13/3 3/13
DIURN12PM 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 19/3 3/20 9/4 3/11
DIURN1PM 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 17/3 3/17 9/4 4/9
DIURN2PM 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 13/3 3/14 7/4 4/8
DIURN3PM 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 7/3 3/6 5/4 4/4
Lags of Dependent Variables And Quote-Related Information
We report the coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables in Panel A of
Table 5.4.10 We observe strong negative serial correlation between the dependent
variables and their rst lag in the home market. We attribute this to quote revisions
due to inventory e¤ects as documented in the literature such as Stoll (2000) and
Engle and Patton (2004).11 Across markets, we observe reactions to changes in the
lagged quotes. The coe¢ cient for the lagged ask price in one market is signicantly
positive on the ask dependent variable of the other market, and signicantly negative
on the bid dependent variable. An increase in the ask price in one market leads to
an increase in the ask price and a decrease in the bid price of the other market in
the following period. The opposite is true for the lagged bid price. This indicates
direct interactions between prices in the two markets.
10For brevity, we only report the rst lag. Full results are available upon request.
11Liquidity suppliers adjust quotes to induce inventory equilibrating trades. For example, when
a sale takes place, the bid price tends to fall to discourage additional sales.
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Table 5.4: Coe¢ cients of the rst lagged dependent variables on the quote model
This table reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables
(coe¢ cients A(l), B,  l in Equation 5.1). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of
times the variable was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a
total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
ASKUSt 1 -0.279 0.258 0.073 -0.078
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 88 87 / 0 65 / 0 0 / 67
BIDUSt 1 0.262 -0.274 -0.076 0.075
Sig + / - (in %) 88 / 0 0 / 88 0 / 66 66 / 0
ASKCANt 1 0.174 -0.183 -0.294 0.321
Sig + / - (in %) 90 / 0 0 / 91 0 / 83 86 / 0
BIDCANt 1 -0.177 0.180 0.324 -0.289
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 87 / 0 0 / 83
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spread
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
SPREADUSt 1 -0.176 0.184 -0.084 0.087
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 0 / 66 67 / 0
SPREADCANt 1 -0.198 0.205 -0.113 0.116
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 90 91 / 0 0 / 62 64 / 0
Panel C: Depth Di¤erence
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 -0.663 -0.662 0.000 -0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 91 0 / 91 5 / 7 6 / 7
DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 0.001 0.000 -0.338 -0.347
Sig + / - (in %) 9 / 8 8 / 10 0 / 83 0 / 84
With regard to spreads, studies such as Jang and Venkatesh (1991) and Easley and
OHara (1992) document that a large spread leads to a fall in the ask price and
a rise in the bid price at the following quote, to restore the spread to its long-run
equilibrium value. Similarly, we expect that a wide spread in one market will narrow
the spread in the other market to ensure the competitiveness of prices in the two
markets. This will be reected in a decrease in ask price and an increase in bid
price.
The empirical results in Panel B of Table 5.4 show the impact of the lagged spread
on quotes in both markets. A wide spread in the home market leads to a decrease in
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the ask price and an increase in the bid price of the same market, moving the spread
toward its equilibrium value. We nd that the coe¢ cient of the U.S. spread on the
changes in U.S. ask (bid) is signicant and consistent with the hypothesized sign in
90% (91%) of the time. The coe¢ cient of the Canadian spread on the changes in
Canadian ask (bid) is signicant and consistent with the hypothesized sign in 62%
(64%) of the time. Bid and ask prices react to changes in spreads, indicating error-
correcting behavior of the spread. We attribute this to competition between liquidity
providers. This nding also suggests that new orders tend to be placed within the
quotes when the spread is large. Therefore, changes in spread is not permanent but
temporary. This is consistent with the arguments of Jang and Venkatesh (1991) and
Easley and OHara (1992), as well as the ndings of Engle and Patton (2004).
We also observe that spreads a¤ect quotes across markets. For instance, an increase
in spreads in the U.S. leads not only to a decrease in the ask price and an increase
in the bid price in the U.S., but also in Canada. Similarly, an increase in spreads in
Canada leads to a decrease in the ask price and an increase in the bid price in both
Canada and the U.S. These ndings indicate some degree of intermarket competition
between liquidity providers to ensure the comparability of prices between the two
markets. In addition, the magnitude of the Canadian spread coe¢ cients are higher
on the U.S. quotes than the U.S. spread coe¢ cients on the Canadian quotes. This
nding can be attributed to the fact that percentage spread, on average, is higher in
the U.S. than in Canada as shown in the summary statistics in Table 5.2, of which
41 out of 64 stocks report higher percentage spreads in the U.S. than in Canada.
Consistent with Jang and Venkatesh (1991) and Escribano and Pascual (2006), the
responses of the bid and ask prices are greater when the bid-ask spread is wide than
when the spread is narrow.
Next, we investigate the impact of depth on quotes. Huang and Stoll (1994) suggest
that the di¤erence between the depth at the ask and at the bid is informative. The
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signalling e¤ect suggests that high depth at the ask relative to the bid indicates
excess number of sellers relative to buyers, indicating that the stock is overpriced.
The barrier e¤ect suggests that excess depth means less volume is required before a
downward movement than an upward movement. Either of these e¤ects lead to less
buyers and more sellers, thus lowering the ask price and increasing the bid price.
Panel C of Table 5.4 reports the coe¢ cients of the lagged depth di¤erence on the
bid and ask prices. We observe that an increase in depth di¤erence in the U.S.
leads to a strong decrease in the home market bid and ask prices. The coe¢ cients
for DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 are negative in 91% of the time for both U.S. ask and bid
quotes, respectively. The same applies to the depth di¤erence in Canada, of which
the coe¢ cients are negative in 83% (84%) of the time for the ask and bid quotes,
respectively. This is strong evidence for the signalling and barrier e¤ects which leads
to lower bid and ask prices.
The cross-market impact of depth di¤erence is insignicant and almost negligible.
Traders do not seem to pick up information conveyed in depth di¤erence from across
market. This indicates an absence of information spillover across market. In this
respect, we conclude that the signalling and barrier e¤ects as shown in Huang and
Stoll (1994) only a¤ect quotes of the same market.
The Importance of Trade-Related Information
Another important concept in market microstructure is that trades convey infor-
mation and a¤ect the fundamental value of a stock. Trade-related features such as
direction, size, duration, and order ow are known to be informative and may cause
revisions in market quotes.
Panel A of Table 5.5 reports the coe¢ cients of the trade direction variables on the
bid and ask prices. Our ndings on the impact of trade on home market quotes are
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Table 5.5: Coe¢ cients of the trade-related variables on the quote model
This table reports the average of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the trade-related
variables (coe¢ cients  (l)2 ,  
(l)
3 , and  4 in Equation 5.1). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count
of number of times the variable was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively,
out of a total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Trade Direction
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY USt 1 0.147 0.104 -0.003 0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 71 / 1 51 / 1 0 / 19 18 / 0
SELLUSt 1 -0.104 -0.152 -0.002 0.003
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 51 1 / 71 0 / 18 20 / 0
BUY CANt 1 -0.004 0.003 0.092 0.076
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 18 16 / 0 42 / 1 32 / 2
SELLCANt 1 -0.002 0.004 -0.091 -0.107
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 16 17 / 0 2 / 30 1 / 41
Panel B: Trade Volume
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY VMEDUSt 1 0.026 0.036 0.000 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 11 / 7 12 / 5 3 / 2 2 / 2
SELLVMEDUSt 1 -0.033 -0.026 0.000 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 6 / 12 7 / 11 3 / 1 1 / 3
BUY VMEDCANt 1 0.001 -0.002 0.081 0.082
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 3 3 / 4 16 / 4 17 / 4
SELLVMEDCANt 1 0.001 0.000 -0.087 -0.087
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 3 3 / 4 4 / 16 4 / 16
Panel C: Trade Duration
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
BUY V DURATIONUSt 1 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 13 / 4 20 / 2 16 / 0 0 / 16
SELLV DURATIONUSt 1 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 21 4 / 13 16 / 0 1 / 16
BUY V DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 16 / 1 1 / 16 7 / 7 11 / 4
SELLV DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 15 / 1 1 / 16 4 / 11 7 / 7
Panel D: Total Trade
ASKUS BIDUS ASKCAN BIDCAN
TOTALBUY US 0.261 0.312 -0.003 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 66 / 1 74 / 0 1 / 7 4 / 2
TOTALSELLUS -0.393 -0.270 0.001 0.004
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 75 1 / 68 2 / 4 7 / 1
TOTALBUY CAN -0.001 -0.001 0.410 0.409
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 9 7 / 5 66 / 1 68 / 1
TOTALSELLCAN 0.003 0.006 -0.479 -0.508
Sig + / - (in %) 4 / 7 10 / 2 0 / 70 1 / 68
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consistent with the proposition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Huang and Stoll
(1994), a buyer-initiated trade raises both the bid and the ask prices, while the seller-
initiated trade lowers the quotes. Bid and ask prices do not respond symmetrically
to trade-related information. Buyer-initiated trades are more important to the ask
price, while seller-initiated trades are more important to the bid price, in either
market.12
When we consider the cross-market impacts of trades, we observe that liquidity
providers across markets react by reducing their spreads. For instance, a buyer-
initiated trade in the U.S. leads to a decrease in the ask price and an increase in the
bid price in Canada by 19% and 18% of the time, respectively. Despite the small
coe¢ cients, these ndings suggest that liquidity providers adjust their prices based
on trades from across markets to some extent. Hence, there seems to be some degree
of information spillover coming from trades between the two markets.
Our empirical results reported in Panel B of Table 5.5 indicate that medium-
sized trades matter only to a small extent.13 The coe¢ cients BUY VMED and
SELLVMED are signicant in 11% for the ask and bid price in the U.S., and 16%
for the ask and bid price in Canada despite their relatively large magnitudes. These
coe¢ cients have the priori expected signs: where a BUY VMED variables all have
positive signs on the bid and ask prices while SELLVMED all have negative signs.
Across market, however, we do not observe signicant impacts of trading volume on
quotes.
Panel C in Table 5.5 reports the coe¢ cients on the interaction between bid and ask
prices and trade duration. We nd that the coe¢ cients are small but signicant,
both on home market quotes, as well as across market. A buy transaction in the U.S.
12The results for the other lags are consistent with these ndings, albeit lower signicance. They
are available upon request.
13We also conducted the analysis by adding the small size trades alongside the medium size
trades. We did not observe signicance for the small size trade variables, nor did we nd signi-
cantly di¤erent results for the medium size trades.
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leads to an increase in the ask and bid prices 13% and 20% of the time, respectively.
This nding suggests that trades that occur after a long period of inactivity is
informative and a¤ect prices. This is consistent with Easley and OHara (1992)
and Dufour and Engle (2000) who explain that the absence of trade could provide
information to market participants. Across markets, we nd that trades occuring
after a long period of inactivity leads to a wider spread. For example, an increase
in BUY V DURATIONUSt 1 leads to an increase in the ask price and a decrease in
the bid price in Canada 16% of the time. We interpret this nding as inactivity in
one market implies that trades are taking place in the other market. In such a case,
liquidity providers in the other market have the incentive to increase their spreads.
Panel D on Table 5.5 reports our empirical ndings on the importance of order ow
on quotes. We nd that order ow is highly signicant in explaining quote dynamics.
We observe that TOTALBUY strongly increases both ask and bid prices in their
respective markets, while TOTALSELL strongly decreases them. This suggests
that liquidity providers set quotes based on the observations of the current and past
aggregate quantities traded in the market, consistent with Kyle (1985). We further
observe negligible impacts of order ow on quotes across market.
Overall, Table 5.5 shows that while trades tend to be more signicant in their respec-
tive market, prices are also a¤ected by trades from another market. We therefore
conclude that prices in each market are primarily determined by information gen-
erated in the same market, and to a small extent, by information generated in the
foreign market.
5.5.2 Implied Model for Spreads, Midpoint Returns, and
Price Premium
The linkages between quote revisions and quote- and trade-related information are
assessed using the model in Equation (1). Based on the quote model, we can derive
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an implied VAR for various market microstructure variables. In this study, we assess
the bid-ask spreads in the two markets, the midpoint returns and the di¤erence in
midquotes across markets. The impacts of information on spreads are of particular
interest because spreads measure the amount of friction in each of the markets.
The impact of information on midpoint returns is also important as the midpoint
represents the implied e¢ cient price of the cross-listed stock. This allows us to test
whether the fundamental value of the stock varies from buyer- and seller-initiatied
trades, as well as quote-related information. Finally, the di¤erence in midquotes
across markets represents the relative premium of prices in one market over the
other.
The implied VAR is derived by rotating Equation (5.1). The derivation of this model
can be found in Appendix (A.1). We transform the quote model into a model for
the log spread in each market, SPREADAt and SPREAD
B
t , the log di¤erence in
the midquotes from both markets,  log(MQt), and the cross-market di¤erence in
log midquotes, log(MQA Bt ) as specied below:
110
Chapter 5. Quote Dynamics of Cross-Listed Stocks
266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
 log(MQt)
log(MQA Bt )
377777775
=ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j) 
0BBBBBBB@
T1 
266666664
SPREADAt j
SPREADBt j
 log(MQt j)
log(MQA Bt j )
377777775
  T2 
266666664
SPREADA
t (j+1)
SPREADB
t (j+1)
 log(MQt (j+1))
log(MQA B
t (j+1))
377777775
1CCCCCCCA
+

K + eB  T3 
266666664
SPREADAt 1
SPREADBt 1
 log(MQt 1)
log(MQA Bt 1 )
377777775
+e 1
24 DEPTH_DIFFAt 1
DEPTH_DIFFBt 1
35
+
3X
k=1
e (k)2 
266666666666664
BUY A
(t) k  1
BUY A
(t) k  V
A;med
(t) k
BUY A
(t) k DA(t) k
BUY B
(t) k  1
BUY B
(t) k  V
B;med
(t) k
BUY B
(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+
3X
k=1
e (k)3 
266666666666664
SELLA
(t) k  1
SELLA
(t) k  V
A;med
(t) k
SELLA
(t) k DA(t) k
SELLB
(t) k  1
SELLB
(t) k  V
B;med
(t) k
SELLB
(t) k DB(t) k
377777777777775
+e 4
266666664
Pl(t)
k=1BUY
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
A
(t) kPl(t)
k=1BUY
B
(t) kPl(t)
k=1 SELL
B
(t) k
377777775
+
7X
d=1
e (d)5  hDIURNdt i+e"t; (5.2)
where T1; T2; and T3 are rotation matrices specied in the same appendix.
The coe¢ cients for our implied model are obtained through linear combination of
the parameters estimated in Equation (5.1), while the standard errors are obtained
by applying the same rotation steps to the residuals and variance-covariance matrix
of the same equation. We report the results in the form of mean coe¢ cient for each
stock throughout the entire sample period, along with a percentage count of the
number of times the coe¢ cient was signicantly positive and negative at 5% level.
We use White (1980) corrected standard errors in our estimations to correct for
possible heteroskedasticity. Consistent with the ndings in Table 5.3, we nd that
spreads in both markets are higher at the beginning of the day compared to other
periods. We nd no evidence of an increase in average spreads towards the end of
the day.
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Lags of Dependent Variables And Quote-Related Information
In Table 5.6. we report the results for the implied VAR model. Panel A reports the
coe¢ cients for the lagged dependent variables and Panel B reports the coe¢ cients for
the depth di¤erence. The rst column of each panel lists the explanatory variables
and their statistical signicance, while the rst row of each panel lists the dependent
variables. We discuss the results of each panel one row at a time.
Table 5.6: Coe¢ cients of the rst lagged dependent and liquidity variables on the
implied model
This table reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the dependent variables.
"Sig + / -" denote the percentage count of number of times the variable was signicantly positive
and negative at the 5% level, respectively, out of a total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Lagged Dependent Variables
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
MIDPOINTt 1 0.001 -0.002 0.094 -0.063
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 0 0 / 0 55 / 3 1 / 20
PREMIUMt 1 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.759
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 1 1 / 1 68 / 6 100 / 0
SPREADUSt 1 0.233 -0.066 0.001 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 61 / 6 2 / 43 12 / 10 9 / 8
SPREADCANt 1 -0.192 0.352 0.001 0.000
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 88 81 / 0 12 / 12 9 / 9
Panel B: Depth Di¤erence
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1 -0.003 0.006 -0.470 -0.342
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 3 2 / 2 0 / 99 4 / 70
DEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 0.000 0.007 -0.175 0.250
Sig + / - (in %) 7 / 5 1 / 1 0 / 93 79 / 1
In Panel A of Table 5.6, we rst assess the impacts of lagged midpoint returns on the
dependent variables. A change in midpoint return does not seem to a¤ect spreads in
either market. Midpoint returns (the implied e¢ cient price), however, are observed
to be persistent. Past returns in midpoint predict subsequent midpoint returns,
indicating positive correlation in prices. Huang and Stoll (1994) explain that the
ability to predict returns on the basis of microstructure variables is not necessarily
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inconsistent with an e¢ cient market. Institutional constraints such as the di¢ culty
to continuously adjust limit orders to information contained in prices may explain
such predictive power.14 The impact of midpoint returns on the price premium
is negative. This nding suggests that positive returns in price lead to a greater
increase in Canadian prices relative to the U.S. prices, leading to a decrease in the
price premium.
Second, we examine the impact of price premium on the dependent variables. We
do not observe the impact of price premium on spreads to be signicant in either
market. The price premium, however, has a positive and signicant impact on the
midpoint returns. An increase in premium suggests that the midquote in the U.S.
increases more than the midquote in Canada, leading to an increase in midpoint
returns. The price premium also appears to be persistent with highly positive and
signicant coe¢ cients. This nding suggests that positive premiums in the U.S.
tends to be positively and serially correlated.
The third and fourth rows of Panel A report the coe¢ cients of the bid-ask spreads
on the dependent variables. The spreads appear to be persistent in each market.
The coe¢ cients for SPREADUSt 1 and SPREAD
CAN
t 1 are positive and signicant
61% and 81% of the time, respectively. The lagged spreads also seem to a¤ect
the spreads across market in the subsequent period. In particular, the coe¢ cients
for SPREADt 1 are negative for the spread dependent variables of the other mar-
ket. Since spreads mean-revert, intermarket competition implies that an increase in
spread in one market leads to a decline in spreads in another market. We do not
observe a clear pattern on the impact of spreads on the midpoint returns and the
price premium since the coe¢ cients seem to be equally signicant in both directions.
Panel B of Table 5.6 reports the coe¢ cients of the lagged depth di¤erence on the
14Positive short-run autocorrelation may occur as a result of prices being less than fully informa-
tionally e¢ cient. Once prices reect all public and private information, returns no longer display
autocorrelation.
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implied model. We do not observe any impact of the depth di¤erence on spreads.
However, the coe¢ cients for DEPTH_DIFFt 1 on the midpoint returns are neg-
ative and signicant. This can be interpreted as large depth di¤erence in either
market indicating oversupply of assets traded, thus suggesting that the stock is
overpriced, leading to less buying and more selling by investors. Since a change in
depth di¤erence lowers quotes of the home market, the impacts on the price pre-
mium are signicantly negative and signicantly posistive for DEPTH_DIFFUSt 1
andDEPTH_DIFFCANt 1 , respectively. In terms of magnitude, the impacts on mid-
point returns and price premium are greater (in absolute terms) for the U.S. com-
pared to Canadian depth di¤erence, indicating asymmetric reactions by investors in
the two markets.
The Importance of Trade-Related Information
Finally, we examine the importance of trade-related information on the implied
variables of spreads, midpoint returns, and price premium. Panel A in Table 5.7
shows that trade direction has very little impact on spreads. We observe positive
coe¢ cients of buyer and seller-initiated trades on the U.S. bid-ask spread which are
signicant 19% of the time. While the asymmetric impacts of buys and sells on the
bid and ask prices are apparent as shown in Panel A of Table 5.5, it is not easily
detectable in a model for the spread. Similar relations between trades and spread
are observed in Canada, in which the coe¢ cients are positive, but not statistically
signicant. We do not observe a noticable impact of trades on spreads across market.
In terms of the implied e¢ cient price, both purchases in the U.S. and Canada lead to
an increase in midpoint returns, whereas sells from either market lead to a decrease.
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) explain that the presence of informed agents in the
market means that trade increases the uncertainty about the true price of a stock.
Hence, bid and ask prices increase following a trade, leading to a rise in midpoint.
As for the price premium, purchases in the U.S. lead to an increase in price premium,
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Table 5.7: Coe¢ cients of the trade-related variables on the implied model
This table reports the mean of the estimated coe¢ cients for the rst lag of the trade-related
variables (coe¢ cients e (l)2 , e (l)3 , and e 4 in Equation 5.2). "Sig + / -" denote the percentage count
of number of times the variable was signicantly positive and negative at the 5% level, respectively,
out of a total of 14,400 observations.
Panel A: Trade Direction
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY USt 1 0.041 -0.013 0.065 0.118
Sig + / - (in %) 19 / 3 0 / 8 74 / 1 73 / 1
SELLUSt 1 0.044 -0.013 -0.063 -0.121
Sig + / - (in %) 19 / 3 0 / 8 1 / 74 1 / 74
BUY CANt 1 -0.007 0.015 0.043 -0.070
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 13 2 / 1 49 / 2 2 / 46
SELLCANt 1 -0.004 0.014 -0.038 0.074
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 12 2 / 1 2 / 48 44 / 2
Panel B: Trade Volume
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY VMEDUSt 1 -0.013 0.003 0.016 0.035
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 3 1 / 1 19 / 9 18 / 9
SELLVMEDUSt 1 -0.011 0.004 -0.015 -0.032
Sig + / - (in %) 2 / 3 1 / 1 10 / 19 10 / 18
BUY VMEDCANt 1 0.002 0.002 0.037 -0.069
Sig + / - (in %) 5 / 5 1 / 2 26 / 6 6 / 24
SELLVMEDCANt 1 0.003 -0.001 -0.039 0.079
Sig + / - (in %) 5 / 5 1 / 1 6 / 25 24 / 6
Panel C: Trade Duration
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
BUY V DURATIONUSt 1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 3 9 / 0 23 / 5 25 / 5
SELLV DURATIONUSt 1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
Sig + / - (in %) 1 / 3 8 / 0 4 / 25 4 / 26
BUY V DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 8 / 4 0 / 1 14 / 10 10 / 13
SELLV DURATIONCANt 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Sig + / - (in %) 8 / 4 0 / 1 10 /15 14 / 9
Panel D: Total Trade
SPREADUS SPREADCAN MIDPOINT PREMIUM
TOTALBUY US -0.027 -0.016 0.154 0.244
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 3 0 / 3 83 / 1 74 / 1
TOTALSELLUS -0.075 -0.010 -0.194 -0.299
Sig + / - (in %) 0 / 2 0 / 3 1 / 84 1 / 75
TOTALBUY CAN -0.008 0.006 0.184 -0.334
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 13 0 / 0 78 / 1 1 / 75
TOTALSELLCAN -0.016 0.044 -0.204 0.392
Sig + / - (in %) 3 / 13 0 / 0 1 / 80 77 / 1
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while sells in the U.S. lead to a decrease in premium. The opposite is true for trades
in Canada. In terms of magnitude, larger coe¢ cients for U.S. trades compared to
Canadian trades on midpoint returns and relative premium indicate strong evidence
of information asymmetry between the two markets. The implied e¢ cient price
appears to be more a¤ected by trading activity occuring in the U.S. rather than the
activity occuring in Canada.
Panel B of Table 5.7 shows that medium-size trades do not a¤ect spreads in either
market. However, they a¤ect midpoint returns and price premium. For the mid-
point, the coe¢ cients BUY VMED (SELLVMED) are signicant 19% (19%) of
time in the U.S., and 26% (25%) in Canada. For the price premium, the coe¢ -
cients BUY VMED (SELLVMED) are signicant in 18% (18%) in the U.S., and
24% (24%) in Canada. These ndings further conrm that the fundamental value
of cross-listed stocks are determined by trading activities in the markets they are
traded in.
As for trade duration, Panel C on Table 5.7 shows that trade duration are signicant
in explaining the change in midpoint returns, and the change in price premium be-
tween the U.S. and Canada. Although the coe¢ cients are small, BUY V DURATION
and SELLV DURATION from both markets lead to an increase and a decrease in
the midpoint returns, respectively. Furthermore, trade duration in the U.S. leads
to an increase in the price premium while trade di¤erence in Canada leads to a
decrease in the price premium. The inverse is true for trade duration variables in
Canada. These ndings suggest that trading inactivities are informative and priced,
consistent with Easley and OHara (1992) and Dufour and Engle (2000).
The impact of order ow is highly apparent, as shown in Panel D of Table 5.7,
particularly on the midpoint returns and price premium. The buy-side order ow
from both markets strongly increase the midpoint returns while the sell-side order
ow strongly lowers it. This is a clear evidence of the importance of order ow on
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the e¢ cient price revision for cross-listed stocks, which is in line with the study of
Kyle (1985). As for the market premium, an increase in TOTALBUY US increases
the premium further while TOTALSELLUS lowers the premium. The inverse is
true for TOTALBUY CAN and TOTALSELLCAN .
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we develop a general model to study quote dynamics of stocks traded
in dual markets. We jointly model revisions of bid and ask prices for two fully-
synchronised markets, and use a variety of quote- and trade-related information to
explain dynamics as indicated by various microstructure theories. From an empirical
perspective, our work extends the VECM specication of Engle and Patton (2004)
into a dual-market setting. Our model can be transformed to an implied VAR for
various microstructure fundamentals such as the bid-ask spreads, the e¢ cient price,
and the price premium.
Applying our model to Canadian stocks which are cross-listed in the U.S., we doc-
ument several important ndings. First, we observe that quote changes in one mar-
ket leads to quote changes in another market, showing direct interactions between
prices in two markets. Second, quote-related information directly a¤ects prices in
both markets, indicating some degree of intermarket competition between liquidity
providers. Third, while prices adjust primarily to trades in their respective market,
they are also a¤ected by trades from another market, indicating a degree of infor-
mation spillover between the two markets. Finally, we nd that information plays
a greater role in the U.S than in Canada, leading to a greater impact of U.S. trades
on the midpoint returns (implied e¢ cient price) and on the di¤erence in midquotes
(price premium).
The ndings above describe the mechanisms of how information gets incorporated
into prices for dually-listed stocks. The prominent impact of bid-ask spread on
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quotes suggests that competition between liquidity providers is an important chan-
nel of information in multiple markets. The majority of information coming from
trades gets incorporated into prices in their respective market, but there is a small
degree of information spillover coming from across market. We also show that the
fundamentals of cross-listed stocks such as the change in e¢ cient price and the
relative premium are not only driven by quote-related information, but also by
trade-related information from any of the two markets. These results suggest that
both sources provide investors with valuable information on the fundamental value
of cross-listed stocks.
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Appendix A.1. Derivation of the Implied Model
Consider the simplied form of the quote model:
Yt = c+
10X
j=1
A(j) Yt j +B  spreadt 1 +
5X
=1
  Xt 1 + "t; (A1)
where Yt =
266666664
 log(ASKAt )
 log(BIDAt )
 log(ASKBt )
 log(BIDBt )
377777775
; spreadt 1 =
24 SPREADAt 1
SPREADBt 1
35; Xt 1 and   represent
other variables and their coe¢ cients. We multiply each of the variables in Equation
(A1) with a rotation matrix, T =
266666664
1  1 0 0
0 0 1  1
0:25 0:25 0:25 0:25
0:5 0:5  0:5  0:5
377777775
, such that eYt= T Yt =
266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
 log(MQt)
 log(MQA Bt )
377777775
; and obtain the following:
eYt = ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j) Yt j + eB  spreadt 1 + 5X
=1
e  Xt 1 + e"t: (A2)
From Equation (A2), we can further restructure the expression into a more desirable
model of the log spread in each market, SPRAt and SPR
B
t , the log di¤erence in the
mid-quote from both markets,  log(MQt), and the cross-market di¤erence in log
mid-quotes, log(MQA Bt ).
Given eZt=
266666664
SPREADAt
SPREADBt
 log(MQt)
log(MQA Bt )
377777775
; T1=
266666664
0:5 0 1 0:5
 0:5 0 1 0:5
0 0:5 1  0:5
0  0:5 1  0:5
377777775
; T2=
266666664
0:5 0 0 0:5
 0:5 0 0 0:5
0 0:5 0  0:5
0  0:5 0  0:5
377777775
;
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T3=
24 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
35 ; and K =
266666664
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
377777775
, we can write the following expressions:
eYt = eZt   (K  eZt 1) (A3)
Yt j = T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1) (A4)
spreadt 1 = T3  eZt 1 (A5)
Using the espressions in Equation (A3) - (A5), we can therefore rewrite Equation
(A2) as:
eZt K  eZt 1 = ec+ 10X
j=1
eA(j)T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1)+ eBT3  eZt 1+ 5X
=1
e Xt 1+e"t:
(A6)
Rearranging Equation (A6) we arrive at the nal model:
eZt = ec+ 10X
j=2
eA(j) T1  eZt j   T2  eZt (j+1)+K + eB  T3  eZt 1+ 5X
=1
e  Xt 1+e"t:
(A7a)
Writing Equation (A7a) out, we get:
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266666664
SPREADAt
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log(MQA B
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+e 1
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Concluding Remarks
This thesis intends to add to the understanding of the price formation process for
stocks with foreign listings. Over the past two decades, equity listings in more than
one market have beneted companies in terms of gaining access to foreign capital
markets. At the same time, foreign listings have intensied intermarket competition
among exchanges. These competitions have emphasized the need to understand how
prices are determined and the mechanisms underlying security trades in multiple
markets. Such understanding is crucial for exchange o¢ cials and market regulators
in order to adjust or introduce new trading rules, keeping markets competitive.
In that respect, the results presented here should be of interest to practitioners,
policy-makers, and academics.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the market microstructure elds that are covered
in this thesis, with a focus on how prices are determined in a market. We rst
discuss the importance of market frictions for prices. We show how frictions lead to
costs of trading, how frictions are considered in modelling prices, and how frictions
a¤ect a markets contribution to price discovery. Given investors preference to
trade in a market with the least cost of trading, ensuring that frictions and costs
of trading are kept to a minimum, should be of consideration to exchange o¢ cials
and market regulators. The chapter further discusses the importance of information
coming from trades. Existing literature suggests that trade-related activities, such
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as the direction of trade, trading volume, and order ow, are informative and lead to
updates in market participantsexpectations about the fundamental value of a stock.
This evidence leads to a question as to whether such information is relevant for stocks
which are listed and traded in multiple markets. Examining such relationships allows
us to understand the mechanism by which information is impounded into prices for
stocks with multiple listings.
The empirical analysis of this thesis starts in Chapter 3 which examines the impact
of information coming from macroeconomic news announcements on price discov-
ery. We show that price discovery, for a sample of Canadian cross-listed stocks,
shifts towards the U.S. during the periods when macroeconomic news is released.
Previous research has mainly suggested that price discovery tends to occur in the
home market, where most of the information regarding the stock is generated. How-
ever, the nding that price discovery still shifts to the U.S. even during Canadian
macroeconomic news announcements suggests that price discovery is also related
to a markets information processing capacity. In this respect, the U.S. market
is the more attractive trading venue to investors because it processes market-wide
information faster than the Canadian counterpart.
We show that the shift of price discovery to the U.S. market is related to the increase
in the trading ratio and the decrease in the spread ratio of the U.S. relative to the
Canadian market. These ndings suggest that the U.S., as the larger and the more
liquid market of the two, is the preferred destination for traders who seek liquidity
and cheaper trading options. The TSX may lack the liquidity of the larger U.S.
exchanges. One possible explanation is because in the U.S., investors have the
options to trade Canadian stocks on the bigger exchange (such as the NYSE), as
well as on various regional exchanges (such as the BSE, CSE, BATS). Competition
between these exchanges may have kept the U.S. market more liquid and the costs of
trading lower. In Canada, on the other hand, investors can only trade in the TSX as
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the sole exchange that trades senior securities. Despite the emergence of alternative
trading venues starting mid-2007, there was no consolidated quotation system nor
Order Protection Rule until late-2010 and early 2011, respectively. These factors
combined may contribute to the ine¢ ciency of the Canadian market relative to
the U.S. market during our sample period. Future research should assess Canadas
information processing capacity, particularly after the implementation of the OPR.
In Chapter 4, we investigate the dynamics of price discovery for Canadian cross-
listed stocks in the U.S. It is observed that the U.S. contribution to price discovery
has increased over the years, especially after the adoption of the Regulation NMS
in the U.S. We nd that improvements in liquidity contribute to such increase. In
particular, an increase in trading volume and a decrease in e¤ective spreads in the
U.S. relative to Canada, lead to greater contribution of the U.S. to price discovery.
These ndings further conrm that investors seem to trade more in a market which
is more liquid and has lower cost of trading, hence indicating areas that exchanges
should focus on to improve price discovery. In addition, we observe that an increase
in price discovery leads to better liquidity, emphasizing the importance of price
discovery for a market. Greater price discovery contributes to the competitiveness
of a market because it attracts more trades in the long-run. This nding may
explain the observed persistence in price discovery; once price discovery is gained
by a market, it tends to remain in that market.
We also show that algorithmic trading activity is negatively related to price dis-
covery. This may caused by the crowding out e¤ect as arbitrageurs make use of
computers to trade aggresively and compete for arbitrage opportunities in their re-
spective markets. As a consequence, high-frequency trading by these arbitrageurs
pushes away informed investors, who are disadvantaged in terms of speed, leading to
lower price discovery. Our nding should be of interest to market regulators because
it indicates that traders without access to high-frequency trading platform are dis-
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advantaged in capitalising the information that they may have. Subsequently, they
may ock to a market with less AT concentration.
In Chapter 5, we propose a model to assess quote dynamics in dual markets. The
model can be used to study the mechanism of how information a¤ects prices of cross-
listed stocks in two di¤erent markets, and to assess the degree of information spillover
between them. We show that quote changes in one market leads to quote changes
in another market, indicating that prices in the two markets are linked directly to
each other. When examining the mechanisms underlying such linkage, we nd that
the change in spreads directly a¤ects prices in both markets. This nding suggests
that there is some degree of intermarket competition between liquidity providers.
Knowing that investors are rational and prefer to trade in the cheaper market,
liquidity providers determine prices based on the cost of trading that they also
observe across market. Our nding implies that markets are not exactly fragmented.
Intermarket arbitrage keeps the prices in the di¤erent markets from drifting apart.
Furthermore, we show that while prices adjust primarily to trades in their respective
market, they are also a¤ected by trades from the other market. This nding indicates
that while the majority of information coming from trades is incorporated into prices
in their respective market, there is some degree of information spillover coming from
the market across. The degree of information spillover seems to be smaller than the
degree of intermarket competition, implying that across market, information coming
from trades are harder to infer compared to information coming from quotes. Future
research should focus on understanding this di¤erence.
Overall, this thesis has covered di¤erent aspects of price formation process for stocks
with foreign listings. It has examined various information sources which are impor-
tant for prices of cross-listed stocks. It has assessed the di¤erence in liquidity and
information processing capacity of various markets. It has also evaluated the mech-
anisms underlying the price formation process in multiple markets. The analyses
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and ndings in this thesis highlight areas which exchanges can improve on to make
markets more e¢ cient and competitive.
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